Synopses & Reviews
This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.
Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemesReview
This volume continues the strong tradition of volume I (2002), supplementing it with foundational material and new results on Arrovian social choice. It also includes new material on fairness, rights, and manipulation, making the two volumes a masterful presentation of all the important topics in the field by its leading experts, including three Nobel laureates. Steven Brams, New York University
This much awaited volume provides authoritative surveys of some of the most important aspects of the theory of social choice and welfare economics. It will be a highly valuable resource for scholars interested in this area. Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside
Social choice theory has produced some of the most powerful (and beautiful) findings in theoretical social science. This long-awaited volume will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars interested in exploring this important field. Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics
Synopsis
This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.
*Advances economists' understanding of recent advances in social choice and welfare
*Distills and applies research to a wide range of social issues
*Provides analytical material for evaluating new scholarship
*Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis.
Synopsis
How do we make collective decisions, distribute goods, incentivize, and punish?
The literature of social choice investigates individual and societal preferences as well as a collective rationality by drawing on a combination of economic theory, philosophical perspectives, and historical records. This volume, edited by the leaders of social choice theory, presents broad yet detailed examinations of its antecedents, its growth and increasing sophistication, and its potential paths of future development. Its contributors record the controversies, the breakthrough concepts, the inherent tension between public welfare and individual rights, and the limitations of their tools. A volume without peers, this collection of original essays captures the infinite variety of responses to this challenging economic domain.
Synopsis
Detailed surveys by leaders in the field examine major contributions to social choice scholarship.
Table of Contents
Preface to Volume 2. Introduction. Part 5: Foundations. 13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow). 14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen). 15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond). 16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. López-Calva).
Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes. 17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark). 18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent). 19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb).
Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice. 20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett). 21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson) 22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet). 23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura). 24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster).
Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness. 25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera). 26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin). 27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).