Synopses & Reviews
This selection of Professor Mellor's work gathers together sixteen major papers on related topics written over the past fifteen years. Together they form a complete modern metaphysics. The book starts with the mind: the subjectivity of the self, consciousness, how like computers we are, and how psychology relates to physics. It then tackles dispositions, natural kinds, physical necessity, objective chances, laws of nature, and the relation of properties to predicates. From this it moves on to causation: what it relates, how it works, how it accomodates chance and defines one definition of time. Finally, the author shows how chance should affect our expectations and decisions, and how it solves the notorious problem of induction.
Review
"The papers are briskly and clearly written, and vigorously argued, as any acquaintance with Mellor's work would lead one to expect....In a short review, it is impossible to adequately convey the richness of this collection. It stands as evidence of Mellor's lasting contribution to contemporary analytic metaphysics." Alex Byrne, The Philosophical Review
Synopsis
This selection of Professor Mellor's papers demonstrates the wide-ranging originality of his work. Together they form a complete modern metaphysics, based on modern science, and cover the nature of the mind, laws of nature, chance, causation, time and the objective basis of our predictions and decisions. A substantial introduction demonstrates the connections between the papers and discusses subsequent developments in the subject, as well as the author's own views. Two of the papers have been especially written for this volume, another has been revised for it, and many have hitherto been relatively inaccessible.
About the Author
D. H. Mellor is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, a Fellow of the British Academy and an Honorary Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities.
Table of Contents
Preface; Introduction; Part I. Minds: 1. Analytic philosophy and the self; 2. I and now (1989); 3. Consciousness and degrees of belief (1980); 4. How much of the mind is a computer? (1988); 5. (with Tim Crane) There is no question of physicalism (1990); Part II. Properties and Laws: 6. In defence of dispositions (1974); 7. Natural kinds (1977); 8. Necessities and universals in natural laws (1980); 9. Laws, chances and properties (1990); 10. Properties and predicates; Part III. Causation: 11. McTaggart, fixity and coming true (1981); 12. The singularly affecting facts of causation (1987); 13. On raising the chances of effects (1988); Part IV. Prediction and Decision: 14. Chance and degrees of belief (1982); 15. The warrant of induction (1988); 16. Objective decision making (1983); References.