Reasons Without Rationalism

"Kieran Setiya urges the radical thesis that the 'should' of practical rationality just is the 'should' of ethical character. His argument turns on taking issue with the orthodox view that practical rationality is exercised under the aspect of the good, and on rejecting all forms of the idea that the nature of practical rationality can be understood from reflection about reason and action as such. Setiya handles his intricate argument deftly, and his book is a pleasure, as well as a challenge, to read. Anyone interested in its topics will need to give it serious attention."--John McDowell, University of Pittsburgh

"It is a great virtue of Kieran Setiya's Reasons without Rationalism that it poses the issue between rationalism and virtue theory in such clear terms. If one accepts the kind of minimalist conception of practical thought that Setiya favors, then there is probably nothing else for good practical thought to be except a disposition to intentional action that is good as a trait of character. Setiya's subtle and provocative development of this line of thought is a substantial philosophical achievement. It offers a distinctive and interesting account of intentional action, and shows how that account provides the basis for a distinctive way of thinking about practical reason, in terms of virtues of character."--Jay Wallace, University of California, Berkeley

"This is a valuable work that contains sharp and interesting arguments. It is original and makes a refreshing contribution to a discussion that, while it fascinates many moral psychologists, threatens to become stale and repetitive. It should also be of interest to ethicists and metaethicists, even though it is not about morality in the narrow sense."--Nomy Arpaly, Brown University

Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act.

Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good.

Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.

Preface ix

Introduction 1

1. "Squeezing the Good into the Right through the Tubes of Imperfection" 7

2. The Relevance of Action Theory 14

PART ONE: Explaining Action 21

1. A Puzzle about Intention 23

2. The Belief-Desire Model 28

3. Acting for Reasons 39

4. Solving the Puzzle 48

5. A Causal Theory of Action? 56

6. Against the Guise of the Good 59

PART TWO: Why Virtue Matters to the Study of Practical Reason 68

1. Character and Practical Thought 70

2. An Argument for the Virtue Theory 79

3. Practical Reason and the Guise of the Good 86

4. Motivation and Desire 99

5. Self-Knowledge as the Aim of Action 107

Conclusion 116

Bibliography 121

Index 129