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The striking thing about surprise attack is how frequently it succeeds--even in our own day, when improvements in communications and intelligence gathering should make it extremly difficult to sneak up on anyone. Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to to anticipate the coming war.
Kam analyzes eleven major surprise attacks that have been launched since the outbreak of World War II (by no means the only ones that occured), starting with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in 1940 and ending with the Eyptian-Syrian attack on Isreal in 1973, in a systematic comparative effort to find the elements that successful sorties have in common. He tackles the problem on four levels: the individual analyst, the small group, the large organization, and the decision makers.
Emphasizing the psychological aspects of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties, mistakes, and idées fixes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgmental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.
Synopsis
The striking thing about surprise attack is how frequently it succeeds--even in our own day, when improvements in communications and intelligence gathering should make it extremly difficult to sneak up on anyone. Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to to anticipate the coming war.
About the Author
Ephraim Kam is Deputy Head, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University, Israel.Thomas C. Schelling is Distinguished University Professor, Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University. He is co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.
Table of Contents
Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling
Introduction
PART I: THE COMPONENTS OF SUPRISE ATTACK
1. The Essence of Suprise Attack Reaction to Disasters and Warnings
Aspects of Erroneous Estimates
The Strategic Warning
Surprise and Military Preparedness
2. Information and Indicators
Quality of Intelligence Information
Early Warning Indicators
Signal and Noise
Quantity of Intelligence Information
3. Intentions and Capabilities
Inference and Difficulties in Estimating Intentions
The Enemy's Conceptual Framework
Risk Taking by the Enemy
Estimating Capabilities
PART II: JUDGMENTAL BIASES AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
4. Conceptions and Incoming Information
The Set of Conceptions
The Persistence of Conceptions
Assimilating Information
Information and Expectations
Treating Discrepant Information
Cognitive Biases and Overconfidence
5. The Process of Analysis
Prediction and Intelligence Analysis
Stages of Intelligence Analysis
Approaches for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses
Analogies and Learning from History
Evaluating Incoming Information
hoosing among Alternative Hypotheses
External Obstacles to Perception
Changing a View
PART III: THE ENVIROMENT
6. The Analyst and the Small Group
The Other Opinion
Groupthink
Pressures for Conformity
The Leader and the Expert
Group Risk Taking
7. Organizational Obstacles
The Military Organization
Rivalry, Coordination, and Communication
Intrinsic Problems in the Intelligence Organization
Military Men and Suprise Attack
8. Intelligence and Decision Makers
Decision Makers and Intelligence Production
Commitment to a Policy
How Decision Makers Affect the Intelligence Process
Decision Makers and Suprise Attack
Conclusion: Is Suprise Attack Inevitable?
The Complexity of the Problem
Why Safeuards Usually Fail
War without Surprise?
Notes
Bibliography
Index