Synopses & Reviews
In this provocative and readable volume, eleven leading constitutional authorities challenge "business as usual" in American foreign policymaking. For far too long, they contend, Americans have acquiesced to presidential claims to sweeping executive powers in foreign
affairs—thanks to imperial-minded presidents, a weak-willed Congress, and neglectful scholars.
These authors forcefully argue that the president is not the supreme crafter of foreign policy and that Congress must provide more than a rubber stamp for the president's agenda. Unilateral presidential control of foreign relations, they warn, can pose a grave threat to our nation's welfare and is simply without constitutional warrant.
Combining constitutional theory with keen historical insights, these authors illuminate the roots of presidential abuse of executive power and remind us of the past and potential costs of such disregard for our unique system of checks-and-balances. An essential guide for all concerned citizens and members of Congress, this volume should help revive a proper understanding of this crucial dimension of American democracy.
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. 383-385) and index.
Table of Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part One—Constitutional Principles and Democratic Norms
1. Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, David Gray Adler
2. Democratic Theory and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy, Larry N. George
Part Two—Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Affairs
3. The President, Congress, and the Fulcrum of Foreign Policy, Robert J. Spitzer
4. Presidential Prerogative and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism, Donald L. Robinson
5. The President's Recognition Power, David Gray Adler
6. Why the President Almost always Wins in Foreign Affairs, Harold Hongju Koh
Part Three—The Constitution and Warmaking
7. The Contitution and Presidential Warmaking, David Gray Adler
8. The Spending Power, Louis Fisher
9. The War Powers Resolution and the Persian Gulf War, Edward Keynes
Part Four—Law and Foreign Policy: Historical Perspectives and Precedents
10. The Washington Administration, Congress, and Algiers, Gerhard Casper
11. The Quasi-War and Presidential Warmaking, Dean Alfange, Jr.
12. Secrecy and Constitutional Controls in the Federalist Period, Daniel N. Hoffman
13. The Barbary Wars: Legal Precedent for Invading Haiti?, Louis Fisher
14. Truman in Korea, Louis Fisher
Appendix A: Federalist Papers
Appendix B: Foreign Affairs Cases
Selected Bibliography
About the Contributors
Index