Synopses & Reviews
In Without Criteria, Steven Shaviro proposes and explores a philosophical fantasy: imagine a world in which Alfred North Whitehead takes the place of Martin Heidegger. What if Whitehead, instead of Heidegger, had set the agenda for postmodern thought? Heidegger asks, "Why is there something, rather than nothing?" Whitehead asks, "How is it that there is always something new?" In a world where everything from popular music to DNA is being sampled and recombined, argues Shaviro, Whitehead's question is the truly urgent one. Without Criteria is Shaviro's experiment in rethinking postmodern theory, especially the theory of aesthetics, from a point of view that hearkens back to Whitehead rather than Heidegger. Shaviro does this largely by reading Whitehead in conjunction with Gilles Deleuze, finding important resonances and affinities between them, suggesting both a Deleuzian reading of Whitehead and a Whiteheadian reading of Deleuze. In working through the ideas of Whitehead and Deleuze, Shaviro also appeals to Kant, arguing that certain aspects of Kant's thought pave the way for the philosophical "constructivism" embraced by both Whitehead and Deleuze. Kant, Whitehead, and Deleuze are not commonly grouped together, but the juxtaposition of them in Without Criteria helps to shed light on a variety of issues that are of concern to contemporary art and media practices (especially developments in digital film and video), and to controversies in cultural theory (including questions about commodity fetishism and about immanence and transcendence). Moreover, in his rereading of Whitehead (and in deliberate contrast to the "ethical turn" in much recent theoretical discourse), Shaviro opens the possibility of a critical aesthetics of contemporary culture.
Review
This marvelously informed, powerfully argued book is Michael Tye's latest contribution to the task of finding a naturalistic understanding of consciousness. It is an agenda setter. - < -="" i="" -=""> - Pragmatics and Cognition - < -="" -="">
Review
In opposing dualism, and defending the view that mind is a form of matter, modern materialists often substitute a dualism of their own -- a dualism of concepts rather than properties. Tye has been a leading advocate of this materialist strategy, in his classic Consciousness, Color, and Content and elsewhere. Consciousness Revisited marks a radical intellectual break: Tye offers powerful arguments against his previous position, and a new way to defend materialism, leaning on Bertrand Russell's notion of knowledge by acquaintance. This book is terrific -- the many admirers of the early Tye may be reassured that the later Tye is just as good. < b=""> Alex Byrne <> , Department of Philosophy, MIT and co-author of < i=""> Disjunctivism <>
Review
[An] impressive contribution to the study of consciousness…I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the study of consciousness and perception. < b=""> Yaron Senderowicz <>
Review
andlt;Pandgt;andquot;In opposing dualism, and defending the view that mind is a form of matter, modern materialists often substitute a dualism of their own -- a dualism of concepts rather than properties. Tye has been a leading advocate of this materialist strategy, in his classic Consciousness, Color, and Content and elsewhere. Consciousness Revisited marks a radical intellectual break: Tye offers powerful arguments against his previous position, and a new way to defend materialism, leaning on Bertrand Russell's notion of knowledge by acquaintance. This book is terrific -- the many admirers of the early Tye may be reassured that the later Tye is just as good.andquot; -- andlt;Bandgt;Alex Byrneandlt;/Bandgt;, Department of Philosophy, MIT and co-author of andlt;Iandgt; Disjunctivismandlt;/Iandgt;andlt;/Pandgt; The MIT Press The MIT Press
Review
andlt;Pandgt;andquot;[An] impressive contribution to the study of consciousnessand#133;I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the study of consciousness and perception.andquot; -- andlt;Bandgt;Yaron Senderowiczandlt;/Bandgt;, andlt;Iandgt;Pragmatics and Cognitionandlt;/Iandgt;andlt;/Pandgt; The MIT Press
Review
andlt;Pandgt;"This marvelously informed, powerfully argued book is Michael Tye's latest contribution to the task of finding a naturalistic understanding of consciousness. It is an agenda setter." -- andlt;Bandgt;Frank Jacksonandlt;/Bandgt;, Department of Philosophy, Princeton Universityandlt;/Pandgt; The MIT Press
Synopsis
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenomenal-concept strategy, argues that the strategy is mistaken.
A rejection of phenomenal concepts leaves the materialist with the task of finding some other strategy for defending materialism. Tye points to four major puzzles of consciousness that arise: How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what does the explanatory gap consist and how can it be bridged? How can the hard problem of consciousness be solved? How are zombies possible? Tye presents solutions to these puzzles -- solutions that relieve the pressure on the materialist created by the failure of the phenomenal-concept strategy. In doing so, he discusses and makes new proposals on a wide range of issues, including the nature of perceptual content, the conditions necessary for consciousness of a given object, the proper understanding of change blindness, the nature of phenomenal character and our awareness of it, whether we have privileged access to our own experiences, and, if we do, in what such access consists.
Synopsis
Four major puzzles of consciousness philosophical materialism must confront after rejecting the phenomenal concept strategy.
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenomenal-concept strategy, argues that the strategy is mistaken.
A rejection of phenomenal concepts leaves the materialist with the task of finding some other strategy for defending materialism. Tye points to four major puzzles of consciousness that arise: How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what does the explanatory gap consist and how can it be bridged? How can the hard problem of consciousness be solved? How are zombies possible? Tye presents solutions to these puzzles -- solutions that relieve the pressure on the materialist created by the failure of the phenomenal-concept strategy. In doing so, he discusses and makes new proposals on a wide range of issues, including the nature of perceptual content, the conditions necessary for consciousness of a given object, the proper understanding of change blindness, the nature of phenomenal character and our awareness of it, whether we have privileged access to our own experiences, and, if we do, in what such access consists.
Synopsis
Four major puzzles of consciousness philosophical materialism must confront after rejecting the phenomenal concept strategy.
Synopsis
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called the phenomenal-concept strategy, which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In
Synopsis
andlt;Pandgt;Four major puzzles of consciousness philosophical materialism must confront after rejecting the phenomenal concept strategy.andlt;/Pandgt;
Synopsis
andlt;Pandgt;We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenomenal-concept strategy, argues that the strategy is mistaken.andlt;/Pandgt;andlt;Pandgt;A rejection of phenomenal concepts leaves the materialist with the task of finding some other strategy for defending materialism. Tye points to four major puzzles of consciousness that arise: How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what does the explanatory gap consist and how can it be bridged? How can the hard problem of consciousness be solved? How are zombies possible? Tye presents solutions to these puzzles -- solutions that relieve the pressure on the materialist created by the failure of the phenomenal-concept strategy. In doing so, he discusses and makes new proposals on a wide range of issues, including the nature of perceptual content, the conditions necessary for consciousness of a given object, the proper understanding of change blindness, the nature of phenomenal character and our awareness of it, whether we have privileged access to our own experiences, and, if we do, in what such access consists.andlt;/Pandgt;
About the Author
Michael Tye is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995), Consciousness, Color, and Content (2000), and Consciousness and Persons (2003), all published by the MIT Press.