Synopses & Reviews
Dreams, conceived as conscious experience or phenomenal states during sleep, offer an important contrast condition for theories of consciousness and the self. Yet, although there is a wealth of empirical research on sleep and dreaming, its potential contribution to consciousness research and philosophy of mind is largely overlooked. This might be due, in part, to a lack of conceptual clarity and an underlying disagreement about the nature of the phenomenon of dreaming itself. In
Dreaming, Jennifer Windt lays the groundwork for solving this problem. She develops a conceptual framework describing not only what it means to say that dreams are conscious experiences but also how to locate dreams relative to such concepts as perception, hallucination, and imagination, as well as thinking, knowledge, belief, deception, and self-consciousness.
Arguing that a conceptual framework must be not only conceptually sound but also phenomenologically plausible and carefully informed by neuroscientific research, Windt integrates her review of philosophical work on dreaming, both historical and contemporary, with a survey of the most important empirical findings. This allows her to work toward a systematic and comprehensive new theoretical understanding of dreaming informed by a critical reading of contemporary research findings. Windt's account demonstrates that a philosophical analysis of the concept of dreaming can provide an important enrichment and extension to the conceptual repertoire of discussions of consciousness and the self and raises new questions for future research.
Review
This is the most comprehensive book on dreaming that I have ever encountered. Windt makes a substantial contribution to the science and philosophy of dreams; her taxonomy of hypotheses is well argued and sufficiently articulated to permit other thinkers either to adopt them or propose revisions to them, knowing what they are accepting or rejecting. That map of the terrain is in itself a valuable gift to the field. Dreaming is well written, superbly researched, imaginative, and very astutely reasoned. It has my highest recommendation. The MIT Press
Review
Wake up, William James. Dream consciousness is calling and wants to talk to you. Daniel C. Dennett, author of < i=""> Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness <>
Review
This magnificent book is the best philosophical study of dreaming, bar none. It's also an outstanding work of cognitive science, with huge importance for sleep and dream research, as well as the neuroscience of consciousness. Offering superb synthesis and original theory, this book sets a new standard for the science and philosophy of dreaming in the twenty-first century. J. Allan Hobson, MD, Professor of Psychiatry, Emeritus, Harvard Medical School; Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Review
Jennifer Windt's Dreaming is without doubt the most comprehensive -- and the most sensible -- philosophical treatise on the dreaming mind ever written. Dreaming lays the foundation for a unified future science of dreaming, consciousness, and self. Evan Thompson, Professor of Philosophy, University of British Columbia; author of < i=""> Waking, Dreaming, Being <> and < i=""> Mind in Life <>
Synopsis
A comprehensive proposal for a conceptual framework for describing conscious experience in dreams, integrating philosophy of mind, sleep and dream research, and interdisciplinary consciousness studies.
Dreams, conceived as conscious experience or phenomenal states during sleep, offer an important contrast condition for theories of consciousness and the self. Yet, although there is a wealth of empirical research on sleep and dreaming, its potential contribution to consciousness research and philosophy of mind is largely overlooked. This might be due, in part, to a lack of conceptual clarity and an underlying disagreement about the nature of the phenomenon of dreaming itself. In Dreaming, Jennifer Windt lays the groundwork for solving this problem. She develops a conceptual framework describing not only what it means to say that dreams are conscious experiences but also how to locate dreams relative to such concepts as perception, hallucination, and imagination, as well as thinking, knowledge, belief, deception, and self-consciousness.
Arguing that a conceptual framework must be not only conceptually sound but also phenomenologically plausible and carefully informed by neuroscientific research, Windt integrates her review of philosophical work on dreaming, both historical and contemporary, with a survey of the most important empirical findings. This allows her to work toward a systematic and comprehensive new theoretical understanding of dreaming informed by a critical reading of contemporary research findings. Windt's account demonstrates that a philosophical analysis of the concept of dreaming can provide an important enrichment and extension to the conceptual repertoire of discussions of consciousness and the self and raises new questions for future research.
About the Author
Jennifer M. Windt is Assistant Lecturer in the Philosophy Department of the Johannes Gutenberg-University of Mainz, Germany. As of March 2015, she will be a Lecturer at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.