Synopses & Reviews
For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field.
Contributors to Volume 3:
Abigail Baird (Vassar College), William Casebeer (Air Force Academy), Cordelia Fine (Monash University), Nathan Fox (University of Maryland), Uta Frith (University College London, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience), Jordan Grafman (National Institute of Health), Joshua Greene (Harvard University), Catherine Hynes (School of Psychology, University of Queensland), Fatima Azavedo Ignacio (Cognitive Psychology, Instituto Philippe Pinel), Richard Joyce (Australian National University Research School of Social Science), Jerome Kagan (Harvard University) Leonard Katz (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Kent Kiehl (Yale University), Jeanette Kennett (Center for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Australian National University), Melanie Killen (University of Maryland), Daniel Lapsley (Ball State University), Heidi Maibom (Carleton University), Victoria McGeer (Princeton University), John Mikhail (Georgetown Law School), Jorge Moll (National Institute of Health), Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona), Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza (Universidade do Rio de Janeiro), Adina Roskies (Dartmouth College), Mirella L. M. F. Paiva (National Institutes of Health), Jana Schaich Borg (Olin Neuropsychiatry Research Center, Institute of Living), Katrina Sifferd (Dartmouth College), Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Dartmouth College), Michael Smith (Princeton University), Mark Timmons (University of Arizona), Frederick de Vignemont (Institut des sciences cognitives, CNRS), Paul Whalen (Dartmouth College), Roland Zahn (National Institute of Health).
Review
"Moral Psychology represents a powerful and penetrating discussion of the emerging science of moral behavior. Each volume cross-examines important arguments which lead to fascinating dialogues on this compelling subject. With these volumes, Sinnot-Armstrong is revealed as a leading mind in this field."
—Michael S. Gazzaniga, Director, Sage Center for the Study of the Mind, University of California, Santa Barbara
Review
andquot;This substantial volume of papers and responses raises and discusses many important issues for all those interested in ethics and moral psychology. I look forward to the other volumes in the series as well.andquot;
--Peter Singer, Ira W. Decamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University
Review
"In the last decade moral psychology has been transformed into one of the most interesting and important areas of interdisciplinary research—a field where philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and economists interact productively. Recent theories and findings have generated a genuine and justified sense of intellectual excitement. If you want to see what all the excitement is about, this book is a great place to start."
—Stephen Stich, Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Rutgers University
Review
"Moral Psychology is a remarkable publishing achievement. Sinnott-Armstrong has a real talent for drawing together the cutting-edge researchers in the field, and letting them present their positions and challenge each other. These three substantial volumes cover many of the newer and more exciting issues being raised in ethics and moral psychology today. Essential reading for anyone who wants to know where the field is heading."
—Peter Singer, Ira W. Decamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University
Synopsis
For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field.
Synopsis
Philosophers and psychologists discuss new collaborative work in moral philosophy that draws on evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience.
Synopsis
For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001.
The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism.
Contributors to volume 3: Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn
Synopsis
andlt;Pandgt;For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.Contributors Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn andlt;/Pandgt;
About the Author
CHARLES W. HAXTHAUSEN is Professor of art history and Director ofthe graduate program in the History of Art at Williams College. Heis the editor of The Two Art Histories: The Museum and the University(Clark Art Institute and Yale University Press, 2003), and iscurrently working on the art criticism of Carl Einstein. His "BloodySerious: Two Texts by Carl Einstein" appeared in October 105.