Synopses & Reviews
Although the study of politics dates to ancient Greece, the basic questions that interested those earliest political scientists still linger with us today: What are the origins of government? What should government do? What conditions foster effective governance? Rational choice theory offers a new means for developing correctable answers to these questions.
This volume illustrates the promise of rational choice theory and demonstrates how theory can help us develop interesting, fresh conclusions about the fundamental processes of politics. Each of the books three sections begins with a pedagogical overview that is accessible to those with little knowledge of rational choice theory. The first group of essays then discusses various ways in which rational choice contributes to our understanding of the foundations of government. The second set focuses on the contributions of rational choice theory to institutional analysis. The final group demonstrates ways in which rational choice theory helps to understand the character of popular government.
Review
Politics from Anarchy to Democracy offers both a primer in political philosophy and an introduction to rational choice theory, one of the dominant paradigms in political science. Unique in its scope, this volume is both accessible and provocative, and I expect it will have a significant impact on both theory and practice.” Michael C. Munger,Duke University
Review
"This volume is an important addition to the rational choice library. It contains an excellent and varied set of chapters on institutional choice, explaining the conditions and development of social institutions, institutional design, and the structures of stable democracy." Keith Dowding,London School of Economics
Synopsis
“Politics from Anarchy to Democracy offers both a primer in political philosophy and an introduction to rational choice theory, one of the dominant paradigms in political science. Unique in its scope, this volume is both accessible and provocative, and I expect it will have a significant impact on both theory and practice.” —Michael C. Munger,Duke University
“This volume is an important addition to the rational choice library. It contains an excellent and varied set of chapters on institutional choice, explaining the conditions and development of social institutions, institutional design, and the structures of stable democracy.” —Keith Dowding,London School of Economics
About the Author
The editors are all affiliated with the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland where Irwin L. Morris is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, Joe A. Oppenheimer is Professor and Director of the University's Collective Choice Center, and Karol Edward Soltan is Associate Professor.