Synopses & Reviews
Rent-seeking is about buying influence, which can range from lobbying to corruption. The concepts of rents and rent-seeking are central to any discussion of the processes of economic development. Yet conventional models of rent-seeking are unable to explain how it can drive decades of rapid growth in some countries, and at other times be associated with spectacular economic crises. This book argues that the rent-seeking framework has to be radically extended if it is to explain the anomalous role played by rent-seeking in Asian countries.
Synopsis
A critique of economic conventional wisdom about rent-seeking, corruption and the development process.
Synopsis
This book provides a critique of economic conventional wisdom about rent-seeking, corruption and the development process. It provides a new approach to understanding and explaining the effects of rent-seeking in different countries.
Table of Contents
Introduction Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo K. S.; 1. Rents, efficiency and growth Mushtaq H. Khan; 2. Rent-seeking as process Mushtaq H. Khan; 3. Rent-seeking and economic development in Thailand Richard F. Doner and Ansil Ramsay; 4. Thailand's old bureaucratic polity and its new semi-democracy Michael T. Rock; 5. Obstructive corruption: the politics of privilege in the Philippines Paul D. Hutchcroft; 6. Funny money: fiscal policy, rent-seeking and economic performance in Indonesia Andrew Macintyre; 7. The Malaysian development dilemma Jomo K. S. and E. T. Gomez; 8. Financial sector rents in Malaysia Chin Kok Fay with Jomo K. S.