Synopses & Reviews
Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What plans were there for using it? Employing the previously inaccessible confidential records of the British government in the decade after World War II, including those of the Chiefs of Staff, this book provides the first detailed assessment of the technical, political, and economic factors behind British nuclear policy. The authors argue that British thinking on nuclear deterrence was distinctive and made a unique contribution to early theorizing on nuclear weapons, and compare the strategic thought of Britain and the United States.
Review
"Sspecialists in British nuclear policy, defense policy making and post-war Anglo-American relations will find this book rewarding....[This book] will reward the reader with information and thought provoking insights into the first two nuclears decades."--British Politics Group Newsletter
"A fascinating book."--The International History Review
"The research is prodigious....The result is an important addition to cold war historiography."--American Historical Review