Synopses & Reviews
With global markets in turmoil, financial crisis management is the vital topic of this decade. Examining the role that the International Monetary Fund has played since 1976, this volume explores: Britain's stand-by from the late 1970s, the Fund's apparent marginalization in the global economy following the Asian financial crisis, and early responses to the Greek sovereign debt crisis. By focusing on the ideas and interests of domestic policy-makers, Rogers is able to demonstrate how the Fund has been used by domestic economic policy-making elites to reconcile contradictions between accumulation and legitimation that appear inherent to the social relations of capitalism.
About the Author
CHRIS ROGERS is Teaching Fellow in International Political Economy at the University of York, UK. He has worked on the evolution of Britain's relationship with the International Monetary Fund since the 1970s and has published articles in Politics and Policy, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, British Politics, and The Political Quarterly.
Table of Contents
Introduction The Politics of Economic Policy-Making: Conceptualizing IMF Lending The Context of Program Ownership: British Economic Policy in 1974 Establishing Program Ownership 1: The Sterling Exchange Rate and Counter-InflationEstablishing Ownership 2: External Financing and Public ExpenditureConsolidating Ownership: The 1976 IMF loan The Legitimacy Deficit: Competing Institutions, Competing Consensus, and Self-InsuranceThe IMF and European Sovereign Debt: New Crisis, New Clients Conclusions