Synopses & Reviews
A Popular Mechanics Best Book
Winner of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Gardner-Lasser Aerospace History Literature Award
Finalist for the American Astronautical Society’s Eugene M. Emme Astronautical Literature Award
“We all watched in shock and disbelief when Challenger was lost. Probably no one felt more disappointment and regret than Allan McDonald, who had warned us not to launch that day. His story tells of loss, grief, and the eventual rebuilding and recovery.”—Robert “Hoot” Gibson, former Space Shuttle pilot and commander
“A major contribution to a difficult episode in the history of human spaceflight.”—Roger D. Launius, Division of Space History, Smithsonian Institution
“There have been many accounts of the circumstances surrounding the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger on 28 January 1986, but few, if any, give as much of an insider’s view as this book.”—Quest
“McDonald argues convincingly that the Challenger accident need not have happened, had his warnings been heeded; therein lies the tragedy.”—Space Policy
“A major contribution to the literature of the management of technology as well as to the history of the space program.”—Choice
“Whistle-blowing yet rigorous and fair-minded book.”—Spaceflight
“An even-handed take on an American aerospace tragedy.”—Book News
“Recounts the decision to launch Challenger, the investigation of the accident, and the return of the shuttle to space flight. McDonald’s book is, like the shuttle itself, a massive, complex, and fascinating work.”—Florida Historical Quarterly
Allan J. McDonald retired as vice president and technical director for advanced technology programs at ATK Thiokol Propulsion in 2001. He was the director of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Project at the time of the Challenger accident and, later, vice president of engineering for space operations during the redesign and requalification of the solid rocket motors. James R. Hansen, professor of history and director of the Honors College at Auburn University, is the author of First Man: The Life of Neil Armstrong.
Synopsis
What they didn't want you to know
"We all watched in shock and disbelief when Challenger was lost. Probably no one felt more disappointment and regret than Allan McDonald, who had warned us not to launch that day. His story tells of loss, grief, and the eventual rebuilding and recovery."--Robert "Hoot" Gibson, former Space Shuttle pilot and commander
"A major contribution to a difficult episode in the history of human spaceflight."--Roger D. Launius, Division of Space History, Smithsonian Institution
"McDonald tells the heartbreaking tale of how he saw his words of warning ignored, and the fateful consequences of that decision."--Donald C. Elder III, Eastern New Mexico University
On a cold January morning in 1986, NASA launched the Space Shuttle Challenger, despite warnings against doing so by many individuals, including Allan McDonald. The fiery destruction of Challenger on live television moments after launch remains an indelible image in the nation’s collective memory.
In Truth, Lies, and O-Rings, McDonald, a skilled engineer and executive, relives the tragedy from where he stood at Launch Control Center. As he fought to draw attention to the real reasons behind the disaster, he was the only one targeted for retribution by both NASA and his employer, Morton Thiokol, Inc., makers of the shuttle's solid rocket boosters. In this whistle-blowing yet rigorous and fair-minded book, McDonald, with the assistance of internationally distinguished aerospace historian James R. Hansen, addresses all of the factors that led to the accident, some of which were never included in NASA's Failure Team report submitted to the Presidential Commission.
Truth, Lies, and O-Rings is the first look at the Challenger tragedy and its aftermath from someone who was on the inside, recognized the potential disaster, and tried to prevent it. It also addresses the early warnings of very severe debris issues from the first two post-Challenger flights, which ultimately resulted in the loss of Columbia some fifteen years later.
Synopsis
The original publication of and#147;The Challenger Launch Decisionand#8221; occurred on January 28th, 1996, the 10th anniversary of that catastrophe. That very morning, a Sunday, the book was features in the New York Timesand#8217; front page story while its author was talking about the book on and#147;Good Morning America.and#8221; While everyone knew that faulty O rings were directly responsible, Vaughanand#8217;s book revealed how and why this problem was both known and ultimately discounted by NASA prior to greenlighting the flight. It quickly went on to become, and still is, the definitive account of the organizational origins of the accident and a model for understanding how complex organizations work more generally. So much so that when space shuttle Columbia disintegrated coming back itno the atmosphere seven years later, Vaughan was asked to consult for the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and then to write a chapter for their formal report. This edition of the book contains a very substantial, new preface offering an insiderand#8217;s perspective on that investigation as well as explaining how the same organizational problems responsible for the Challenger disaster were also at the root of what happened to Columbia.
Synopsis
When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skullduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake.
Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. In a new preface, Vaughan reveals the ramifications for this book and for her when a similar decision-making process brought down NASAand#39;s Space Shuttle Columbia in 2003.
About the Author
Diane Vaughan is professor of sociology and international and public affairs at Columbia University.
Table of Contents
List of Figures and Tables
Preface to the 2016 Edition
Preface
Oneand#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; The Eve of the Launch
Twoand#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; Learning Culture, Revising History
Threeand#160;and#160; Risk, Work Group Culture, and the Normalization of Deviance
Fourand#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; The Normalization of Deviance, 1981andndash;84
Fiveand#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; The Normalization of Deviance, 1985
Sixand#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; The Culture of Production
Sevenand#160; Structural Secrecy
Eightand#160;and#160; The Eve of the Launch Revisited
Nineand#160;and#160;and#160; Conformity and Tragedy
Tenand#160;and#160;and#160;and#160;and#160; Lessons Learned
Appendix Aand#160;and#160; Cost/Safety Trade-Offs? Scrapping the Escape Rockets and the SRB Contract Award DecisionAppendix Band#160;and#160; Supporting Charts and Documents
Appendix Cand#160;and#160; On Theory Elaboration, Organizations, and Historical Ethnography
Acknowledgments
Notes
Bibliography
Index