Synopses & Reviews
This collection of new and previously published essays reflects the major research and thought of one of today's preeminent philosophers of mind. The first seven essays are philosophical pieces that focus on mental representation and the foundations of intentionality; they are followed by four psychological essays on cognitive architecture. In his eloquent introduction, Fodor shows how the two areas are thematically united and epistemologically related, highlighting his interest in finding alternatives to holistic accounts of cognitive content.
Review
Among the books one should read, there are those one must read. This is another must from Jerry Fodor. A brilliant set of essays chronicling (among other things) Fodor's development over the past decade of a theory of mental content. Provocative, witty, challenging and, yes, sometimes exasperating, Fodor simply cannot be ignored. He is too good. The MIT Press
Synopsis
This collection of new and previously published essays reflects the major research and thought of one of today's preeminent philosophers of mind.
This collection of new and previously published essays reflects the major research and thought of one of today's preeminent philosophers of mind. The first seven essays are philosophical pieces that focus on mental representation and the foundations of intentionality; these are followed by four psychological essays on cognitive architecture. In his eloquent introduction Fodor shows how the two areas are thematically united and epistemologically related, highlighting his concern in finding alternatives to holistic accounts of mental content. Fodor's philosophical essays develop an informational view of semantics that offers the possibility of atomism about meaning; his psychological essays present a modular view of cognitive architecture that offers the possibility of atomism about perception. These ideas, he points out, are joined in epistemology in way that the books last essay begins to explore. Taken together, the essays represent Fodor's lively attempt to knock the underpinnings from the currently popular relativism to show that the arguments for semantic and psychological holism are insubstantial and that important alternatives exist to be explored.
Synopsis
Jerry A. Fodor is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and at the City University of New York Graduate Center.
About the Author
Jerry A. Fodor is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and at the City University of New York Graduate Center. He is the author of Modularity of Mind and RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.