Synopses & Reviews
The way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours.
This thought-provoking new book presents an original philosophical analysis bringing together addiction and weakness of will. Within the book, the author develops an integrated account of these two phenomena, rooted in a classical conception of akrasia as valuing without intending and at the same time intending without valuing. This fascinating and suggestive account addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible action.
Addiction and Weakness of Will makes an original contribution to central issues in moral psychology and philosophy of action, including the relationship between responsibility and intentional agency, and the nature and scope of moral appraisal. The book is valuable for philosophers, ethicists and psychiatrists with an interest in philosophy.
About the Author
Lubomira Radoilska,
Affiliated Lecturer, Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge University , UKLubomira Radoilska's research has focused on developing a new theory of autonomous agency and exploring its implications in core areas of philosophy. She holds a doctorate in philosophy from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris. Since 2003, she has held the following positions at the University of Cambridge: Research Fellow at Clare Hall, Director of Studies at New Hall and Downing College, and Wellcome Trust Fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy, where she is currently an Affiliated Lecturer. She is the author of 'Aristotle and the Moral Philosophy of Today' (PUF, 2007) and editor of 'Autonomy and Mental Disorder' (OUP, 2012).
Table of Contents
1. Addiction and Voluntary Control
2. Addiction and Rational Judgement
3. Weakness of Will and Moral Appraisal
4. Before Weakness of Will
5. Addiction and Weakness of Will: An Integrated Account