Synopses & Reviews
The paradigms of dynamic games play an important role in the development of multi-agent models in engineering, economics, and management science. The applicability of their concepts stems from the ability to encompass situations with uncertainty, incomplete information, fluctuating coalition structure, and coupled constraints imposed on the strategies of all the players. This book--an outgrowth of the 10th International Symposium on Dynamic Games--presents current developments of the theory of dynamic games and its applications to various domains, in particular energy-environment economics and management sciences. The volume uses dynamic game models of various sorts to approach and solve several problems pertaining to pursuit-evasion, marketing, finance, climate and environmental economics, resource exploitation, as well as auditing and tax evasions. In addition, it includes some chapters on cooperative games, which are increasingly drawing dynamic approaches to their classical solutions. The book is thematically organized into six parts: * zero-sum game theory * pursuit-evasion games * games of coalitions * new interpretations of the interdependence between different members of a social group * original applications to energy-environment economics * management science applications This work will serve as a state-of-the art account of recent advances in dynamic game theory and its applications for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students in applied mathematics, engineering, economics, as well as environmental and management sciences.
Synopsis
This book, an outgrowth of the 10th International Symposium on Dynamic Games, presents current developments of the theory of dynamic games and its applications. The text uses dynamic game models to approach and solve problems pertaining to pursuit-evasion, marketing, finance, climate and environmental economics, resource exploitation, as well as auditing and tax evasions. It includes chapters on cooperative games, which are increasingly drawing dynamic approaches to their classical solutions.
Table of Contents
Preface Contributors Part I. Zero-Sum Game Theory D. Rosenberg, E. Solan, and N. Vieille: Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring S.S. Kumkov and V.S. Patsko: Level Sweeping of the Value Function in Linear Differential Games V.P. Serov: Optimal Feedback in a Dynamic Game of Generalized Shortest Path Part II. Pursuit-Evasion Games J. Shinar and V.Y. Glizer: New Approach to Improve the Accuracy in Delayed Information Pursuit-Evasion Games A.A. Chikrii: Game Problems for Systems with Fractional Derivatives of Arbitrary Order N.N. Petrov and D.A. Vagin: On Two Problems of Group Pursuit Part III. Games of Coalitions L.A. Petrosjan: Cooperative Stochastic Games Y. Funaki and T. Yamato: The Uniqueness of a Reduced Game in a Characterization of the Core in Terms of Consistency J. Scheffran: The Formation of Adaptive Coalitions T.E.S. Raghavan and P. Sudhölter: On Assignment Games Part IV. New Concepts of Equilibrium A. Vasin: The Folk Theorems in the Framework of Evolution and Cooperation J. Morgan and F. Patrone: Stackelberg Problems: Subgame Perfect Equilibria via Tikhonov Regularization N. Hidano and S. Muto: Extended Self, Game, and Conflict Resolution Part V. Applications to Energy/Environment Economics A. Kryazhimskii, O. Nikonov, and Y. Minullin: Game of Timing in Gas Pipeline Projects Competition: Simulation Software and Generalized Equilibrium Solutions R. McKelvey and P.V. Golubtsov: The Effects of Incomplete Information in Stochastic Common-Stock Harvesting Games A. Haurie, F. Moresino, and L. Viguier: A Two-Level Differential Game of International Emissions Trading A. Haurie: A Stochastic Multigeneration Game for Global Climate Change Impact Assessment Part VI. Management Science Applications P. Bernhard, M. El Farouq, and S. Thiery: An Impulsive Differential Game Arising in Finance with Interesting Singularities S. Jørgensen, S. Taboubi, and G. Zaccour: Incentives for Retailer Promotion in a Marketing Channel A. Suzuki and S. Muto: Farsighted Behavior Leads to Efficiency in Duopoly Markets T.E.S. Raghavan: A Stochastic Game Model of Tax Evasion