Synopses & Reviews
This challenging and provocative book argues against much contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and the social sciences by showing why objectivity in the domain of ethics is really no different from the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Many philosophers and social scientists have challenged the idea that we act for objectively authoritative reasons. Jean Hampton takes up the challenge by undermining two central assumptions of this contemporary orthodoxy: that one can understand instrumental reasons without appeal to objective authority, and that the adoption of the scientific world view requires no such appeal. In the course of the book Jean Hampton examines moral realism, the general nature of reason and norms, internalism and externalism, instrumental reasoning, and the expected utility model of practical reasoning. The book is sure to prove to be a seminal work in the theory of rationality that will be read by a broad swathe of philosophers and social scientists.
Review
"Hampton had a sharp eye for the hidden thread that, once tugged, unravels entire philosophical tapestries. She is in one sense a good ally of expressivism, for she reserves especial scorn for various varieties of naturalism that purport to defend or explain objective authority. As she was well aware, her insistence on its mysterious nature is calculated to discompose some of its more complacent friends. Nevertheless, the best chapters here show a crispness and a focus that demand attention from everyone interested in the phenomena of human reason." Ethics
Synopsis
This challenging and provocative book argues against much contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and the social sciences by showing why objectivity in the domain of ethics is really no different from the objectivity of scientific knowledge. In the course of the book Jean Hampton examines moral realism, the general nature of reason and norms, internalism and externalism, instrumental reasoning, and the expected utility model of practical reasoning. The book should prove to be a seminal work in the theory of rationality that will be read by a broad swathe of philosophers and social scientists.
Synopsis
Shows why objectivity in ethics is no different from the objectivity of scientific knowledge.
Table of Contents
Preface; Introduction; Part I. Science and Objective Norms: 1. Naturalism and moral reasons; 2. The anatomy of a reason; 3. Reasonsâauthority; Part II. Instrumental Reason: 4. Instrumental Reason; 5. Why instrumental reasoning isnât instrumental; 6. Instrumental reasoning and the methodology of science; Part III. Reasons and Reasoning: 7. Expected utility theory and instrumental reasoning; 8. Expected utility theory and consequentialism; 9. Toward a âpost-naturalistâtheory of reasons.