Synopses & Reviews
Consequentialist moral theories, according to which morality requires agents to perform the act that promotes the best overall state of affairs, can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and are highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Much recent work in ethics has consisted of efforts either to mitigate the counter-intuitiveness of generally consequentialist approaches to ethics, or to strike against the fundamental theoretical challenge that consequentialism is taken to provide to considered moral judgments and alternative moral theories. Paul Hurley argues that these discussions of the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism, an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. The fundamental challenge to consequentialism can be introduced by way of two claims. The first claim is that there are some acts that morality prohibits, and others that it requires of us. The second is that we should do what morality requires; we typically have decisive reasons to act in accordance with such moral requirements and prohibitions. Hurley argues that if consequentialists have the right account of the content of morality, then it seems that morality cannot have the rational authority that even they commonly take it to have. Consequentialist moral standards are vindicated only by marginalizing the role of morality in practical reason and deliberation. If, however, morality is authoritative, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of what morality requires and prohibits.
Synopsis
Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challenge consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do what morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral standards. Hurley builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartial evaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, he undermines consequentialist arguments against alternative approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinct conception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but does so, Hurley argues, by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms.
About the Author
Paul Hurley is Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, California.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Challenge to Consequentialism: A Troubling Normative Triad
3. The Demandingness Objection: Too Demanding, Or Not Demanding at All?
4. Harnessing Williams to Sharpen the Challenge to Consequentialism
5. Deflating the Challenge iof Consequentialism
6. From Impersonality to Interpersonality: Alternative Conceptions of Impartiality
7. Impartial Evaluation and Rational Authority
8. Generalizing to Other Forms of Consequentialism
Bibliography