Synopses & Reviews
The first comprehensive analysis of Britain's complex relationship with UN peacekeeping operations during two formative decades. It charts the evolution of British views on an international organization running its own military forces and examines policy-makers' efforts to influence, contain and exploit individual operations: in Palestine, Kashmir, Egypt (following the Suez Crisis), Lebanon, Congo and Cyprus. Benefits included shedding colonial responsibilities, containing conflicts, face-saving, and burden-sharing; perceived risks included interference in remaining colonies and threats to postcolonial interests.
About the Author
Neil Briscoe is UN Program Manager in the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department of the UK Department for International Development.
Table of Contents
Introduction * Antecedents and Early UN Observer Missions * The Creation of the UN Emergency Force, 1956 * Conceptualizing and Delimiting Peacekeeping, 1957-1960 * The UN Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964 * Strengthening Peacekeeping, 1961-1964 * The Creation and Early Operation of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 1964-1967 * Promoting and Defending Peacekeeping, 1964-1967 * Conclusions
Introduction * Antecedents and Early UN Observer Missions * The Creation of the UN Emergency Force, 1956 * Conceptualizing and Delimiting Peacekeeping, 1957-1960 * The UN Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964 * Strengthening Peacekeeping, 1961-1964 * The Creation and Early Operation of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 1964-1967 * Promoting and Defending Peacekeeping, 1964-1967 * Conclusions