Synopses & Reviews
This volume explores how complex economic transactions can be treated in economics, as well as how societies bring order to complex economic and social transactions through various institutional devices. Bringing together eminent scholars from the fields of game theory, complexity, econometrics and law, it explores theoretically and empirically how markets, social norms, and corporate organization and governance evolve, and how these institutions affect economic behavior. The contributors include, besides the editors, S. Cincotti, M. Gallegatti, M. Kandori, K. Pistor, B. Skyrms, R. Sugden, and others.
Synopsis
Drawing on behavioral, experimental and neoclassical economics, this volume brings together eminent academics and practitioners to provide working macroeconomic models and explore the social norms governing a post-crisis financial world.
Synopsis
Drawing on behavioral, experimental and neoclassical economics, this volume brings together eminent academics and practitioners to provide working macroeconomic models and explore the social norms governing a post-crisis financial world.
About the Author
MASAHIKO AOKI is a professor of Economics, Stanford University.
KENNETH BINMORE is Emeritus Professor, University of London, UK.
SIMON DEAKIN is a professor of Law, Cambridge University, UK.
HERBERT GINTIS is Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts.
Table of Contents
PART I: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL REALITY
Theory and Reality in Economics: Insights from Three Allegories; M.KandoriPART II: COMPLEX ECONOMIC DYNAMICS: AGENT-BASED AND ANALYTICAL MODELS
The Dynamics of Pure Market Exchange; H.GintisTowards an Analytical Solution for Agent Based Models; an Application to a Credit Network Economy; C.Guilmi, M.Gallegati, S.Landini and J.StiglitzThe EURACE Macroeconomic Model and Simulator; S.Cincotti, M.Roberto and A.TeglioPART III: SOCIAL NORMS
Aspects of Naturalising the Social Contract; B.SkyrmsThe Role of Salience in the Emergence and Reproduction of Norms; R.Sugden
Fairness as an Equilibrium Selection Device; K.BinmorePART IV: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ORGANISATION
Shapley-Value Parables of Corporations as Evolutive Systems of Associational Cognition; M.AokiAn End to Consensus? The Selective Impact of Corporate Law Reform on Financial Development; S.Deakin, P.Sarkar and A.SinghOn the Plasticity of the Corporate Form; K.PistorGovernment Banks and Growth: Theory and Evidence; S.Andianova, P.Demetriades and A.Shortland