Synopses & Reviews
Deterrence as applied during the cold war loomed larger than other tools of statecraft and was identified more closely with the possible use of devastating military force than should be the case today. The current international environment is radically different from that which it was during the cold war. Threats of very different types, from cyber warfare to terrorist attacks, have become the major dangers to world order. Current and future threats to international security will present relatively fewer situations in which deterrence, least of all nuclear deterrence, will be the most effective tool of statecraft. A new approach is clearly necessary.
This book is a collection of the papers prepared for and presented at the November 2010 Hoover Nuclear Threat Initiative Conference by an expert group of analysts, all of whom have studied deterrence issues for many years. The authors highlight ways deterrence has been shaped by surrounding conditions and circumstances. They look at the prospective reliability of deterrence as a tool of statecraft in the emerging international environment. And they examine the challenges of “weaponless deterrence”: developing approaches to nuclear deterrence that rely not on the actua, but rather on the potential existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, they look at the ongoing debates over “de-alerting” (slowing down the capability for immediate launch and rapid nuclear escalation), the role of arms control, and the practical considerations related to verification and compliance.
As long as nuclear weapons continue to exist, the United States should ensure that its nuclear forces are safe, reliable, and capable of launching a devastating nuclear strike on any nation that attacks it with nuclear weapons. Even after the world reaches the long-for goal of zero nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence will continue to have a vital role for some time to come. As George Shultz says in his foreword to this report, “One thing is clear: no analysis of a world without nuclear weapons can proceed very far without considering the issue of deterrence.”
Synopsis
Drawn from the third in a series of conferences the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on the nuclear legacy of the cold war, this report examines the importance of deterrence, from its critical function in the cold war to its current role. Recognizing that today's international environment is radically different from that which it was during the cold war, the need is pressing to reassess the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence in the world of today and to look ahead to the future.
Synopsis
Drawn from the third in a series of conferences at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on the nuclear legacy of the cold war, this report examines the importance of deterrence, from its critical function in the cold war to its current role. Although deterrence will not disappear, current and future threats to international security will present relatively fewer situations in which nuclear weapons will play the dominant role they did during the cold war.
The authors highlight the ways in which deterrence has been shaped by surrounding conditions and circumstances. They look at the prospective reliability of deterrence as a tool of statecraft in the emerging international environment. And they examine the challenges of “weaponless deterrence”: developing approaches to nuclear deterrence that rely not on the actua, but rather on the potential existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, they look at the ongoing debates over “de-alerting” (slowing down the capability for immediate launch and rapid nuclear escalation), the role of arms control, and the practical considerations related to verification and compliance.
Synopsis
Reassessing the role of nuclear deterrence
Although deterrence will not disappear, current and future threats to international security will present relatively fewer situations in which deterrence, least of all nuclear deterrence, will be the most effective tool of statecraft. This report, drawn from the third in a series of conferences at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on the nuclear legacy of the cold war, examines the importance of deterrence, from its critical function in the cold war to its current role. The contributors discuss how, with today’s international environment radically different from that which it was during the cold war, the need is pressing to reassess the role of deterrence in whatever form it may take to meet the challenges of today’s world.
This use of American influence—a resource of which deterrence is only one part—can foster expectations that trend toward favoring less reliance on nuclear weapons, not more. This report is intended to contribute to the necessary dialogue that may, in time, lead to a consensus that a world without nuclear weapons is a practical enterprise among nations.
About the Author
George P. Shultz is the Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and has had a distinguished career in government, in academia, and in business. He lives in San Francisco. Sidney D. Drell is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor of theoretical physics emeritus at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, Stanford University. He lives in Palo Alto, California. James E. Goodby is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellow with the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He lives in San Jose, California.
Table of Contents
Foreword
by George Shultz
Chapter 1 Deterrence, Its Past and Future
An Introduction to Policy Issues
by James Goodby
Chapter 2 How History and the Geopolitical Context Shape Deterrence
by George Quester and Patrick Morgan
Chapter 3 Redefining the Role of Deterrence
by James Goodby and Michael Mazarr
Chapter 4 Nuclear Deterrence in a World Without Nuclear Weapons
by Sidney Drell and Raymond Jeanloz
Chapter 5 Nuclear Weapons Reconstitution and its Discontents: Challenges of “Weaponless Deterrence”
by Christopher A. Ford
Chapter 6 Playing for Time on the Edge of the Apocalypse: Maximizing Decision Time for Nuclear Leaders
by Christopher A. Ford
Chapter 7 Arms Control and Deterrence
by James M. Acton, Edward Ifft, and John McLaughlin
Chapter 8 Practical Considerations Related to Verification and Compliance
by Edward Ifft
Chapter 9 Deterrence and Enforcement in a World Free of Nuclear Weapons
by David Holloway
Appendices
Appendix A Enforcing Zero: Forget Deterrence!
by Harald Müller
Appendix B Nuclear Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century: An Ethical Analysis
by Tyler Wigg-Stevenson
About the Authors