Synopses & Reviews
In a neoclassical world the existence of non-zero transaction costs, nonconvex technologies, public goods and so on creates inefficiencies which can be dealt with by various institutions. But, institutions can create inefficiencies of their own. This volume addresses the issue of efficiency and institutions from different angles. First, the efficiency of modern welfare states is analyzed on a general level where topics like social justice, redistribution and rent seeking are studied in an environment of pressure groups and self-interested politicians (papers by Streit, Schlieper, Wickström). Second, several papers deal with more specific issues like intergenerational transfers in a social insurance system, the efficiency of law, and contractual arrangements in the labor market (Witt, Rowley and Brough, Monissen and Wenger). Third, allocation procedures for nonexclusive public goods are analyzed (Güth and Hellwig, Pethig).
Table of Contents
Contents: Economic Order and Public Policy-Market, Constitution and the Welfare State.- Macroeconomic Policy, Rent Seeking and Economic Order.- The Growth of Government and the Rise of Pressure Groups.- Family Structure and Intergenerational Transfers in Social Health Insurance: A Public Choice Model.- The Demsetz Hypothesis on the Emergence of Property Rights Reconsidered.- The Efficiency of the Common Law: A New Institutional Economics Perspective.- Specific Human Capital and Collective Codetermination Rights.- Free Riders and Voluntary Contributions Reconsidered.- Competition versus Monopoly in the Supply of Public Goods.