Synopses & Reviews
The September 11 terrorist attacks sparked major efforts to transform executive branch intelligence agencies. Although Congress has been instrumental in many of these post-9/11 executive branch reforms, it has been largely unable to reform itself. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission called congressional oversight "dysfunctional" and warned that fixing oversight weaknesses would be both essential to American national security and exceedingly difficult to achieve. Why have these deficiencies persisted for so long, despite the clarion call for change after 9/11 and the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment?
In Eyes on Spies, Amy Zegart argues that many of Congress's biggest oversight problems lie with Congress itself. Although acknowledging that intelligence policy making has undoubtedly become more partisan and rancorous in recent years, and that individual personalities matter, she shows that the root causes of dysfunctional intelligence oversight cross party lines, presidential administrations, individual congressional leaders, and eras. The author first attempts to define what good oversight looks like—and concludes that, however one defines good oversight, Congress has not been doing it in intelligence for a very long time. She examines existing research in both political science and intelligence studies and finds that both literatures have insights and limitations when it comes to understanding enduring intelligence oversight weaknesses. Taken together, however, both literatures provide essential elements for understanding why intelligence oversight has remained so problematic for so long. Zegart also compares oversight activities of intelligence to other policy areas and reveals that intelligence oversight is always an uphill battle because the issue is always a political loser. In looking specifically at what's wrong, she finds two crucial institutional deficiencies: limited expertise and weak, fragmented budgetary authority.
The author concludes by suggesting policy implications for the future of intelligence oversight-and the picture is not encouraging. The sources of oversight dysfunction, she explains, lie with electoral incentives and institutional prerogatives, and these are not about to disappear. As long as all members of Congress protect congressional committee prerogatives and engage in every-man-for-himself calculations of political self-interest, the current inadequacies in intelligence oversight are unlikely to improve.
Synopsis
Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of US intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congressthe institution, not the parties or personalitiesshowing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.
Synopsis
WHY CONGRESS'S BIGGEST INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROBLEMS LIE WITH ...CONGRESS
Ten years after 9/11, the least reformed part of America's intelligence system is not the CIA or FBI but the US Congress. In Eyes on Spies, Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of U.S. intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.
Supporting sound logic with extensive data, the author offers a comparative analysis of oversight activities of intelligence with other policy areas to show that Congress is not overseeing nearly as much in intelligence as in other policy domains. Electoral incentives, she reveals, explain why. Zegart also identifies two key institutional weaknesses: one, the rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the development of legislative expertise in intelligence and, two, committee jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress's budgetary power over executive branch intelligence agencies. She concludes that, unfortunately, electoral incentives on the outside and the zero-sum nature of committee power on the inside provide powerful reasons for Congress to continue hobbling its own oversight capabilities.
Synopsis
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE—DESTINED TO DISAPPOINT
In the twenty-first century, intelligence has eclipsed military firepower as the nation's most important line of defense. But intelligence agencies cannot go it alone. Legislative oversight, done well, ensures that the intelligence community gets the resources it needs and deploys those resources to maximum effect. In Eyes on Spies, Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of US intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.
Zegart also identifies two key institutional weaknesses: one, the rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the development of legislative expertise in intelligence and, two, committee jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress's budgetary power over executive branch intelligence agencies. She reveals how electoral incentives on the outside and the zero-sum nature of committee power on the inside provide powerful reasons for Congress to continue hobbling its own oversight capabilities.
About the Author
Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and an affiliated faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. She has been featured in the National Journal as one of the ten most influential experts in intelligence reform.
Table of Contents
List of Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: What Does Good Oversight Look Like, Anyway?
Chapter Three: Goldilocks and the Intelligence Oversight Literature
Chapter Four: Policemen, Firefighters, and Spooks: How Oversight Varies Across Policy Domains
(with Julie Quinn)
Chapter Five: Oversight Weapons Gone Weak: Expertise and Budgetary Authority
Chapter Six: Conclusion
About the Author
About the Hoover Institution’s Koret–Taube Task Force on National Security and Law
Index