Synopses & Reviews
Review
Game Theory and the Law promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues. The authors have not only synthesized the existing scholarship, but also created the foundation for the next generation of research in law and economics. Daniel A. Farber, University of Minnesota Law School
Review
Game Theory and the Law is an important book. It is important in the sense that it will serve as a catalyst for an expanded use of game-theoretic models in the study of law. It will be a book that people will one day recognize as having had a considerable influence on its field. And it will receive the praise that accompanies such influence. Happily, such influence will be beneficial to the field of law and such praise will be richly deserved, because Game Theory and the Law is an extremely intelligent and thoughtful text... One of the features of the book that is most striking (and, for my part, most welcome) is the thoughtful and sensible manner in which they approach the use of game theory. Unlike many proponents of game-theoretic analysis, they do not present it as the only legitimate approach to social-scientific analysis. The authors present game theory as a powerful tool that can be used along with other approaches to enhance our understanding of the role of law in social life... The persuasiveness of their general argument for the utility of game theory derives from a combination of the power of their insights along with the sensibility of their analysis. The book is written in a clear, concise and interesting manner. Its bibliographic references render it a source book for additional research in both game theory and law. This is a book that should be read by scholars of law in particular and scholars of political behavior in particular. Jurimetrics Journal
Review
The most comprehensive and encompassing treatment of this approach... [This] is the first nontechnical, modern introduction to how (noncooperative) game theory can be applied specifically to legal analysis... Game Theory and the Law is a user-friendly analysis of concrete, numerical examples, rather than a theoretical presentation of abstract concepts. The authors introduce and explain, with actual legal cases or hypotheticals, the salient issues of modern game theory. This breadth of coverage is remarkable. This is not just a textbook; it is also something of a research monograph, introducing many new models attributable to the authors alone. Peter H. Huang
Synopsis
This book promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues.
About the Author
Douglas G. Baird is Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School.Robert H. Gertner is Professor of Economics and Strategy at the University of Chicago.Randal C. Picker is Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.
University of Chicago Law School
Table of Contents
- Preface
- Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior
- Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
- The Normal Form Game
- Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
- The Nash Equilibrium
- Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
- Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
- Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
- The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
- The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
- A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
- Subgame Perfection
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
- Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
- The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
- Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
- Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
- Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation
- Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
- Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
- Signaling and Screening
- Modeling Nonverifiable Information
- Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
- Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
- Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Reputation and Repeated Games
- Backwards Induction and Its Limits
- Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
- Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
- Collective Action and the Role of Law
- Embedded Games
- Understanding the Structure of Large Games
- Collective Action and Private Information
- Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
- Herd Behavior
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Noncooperative Bargaining
- Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
- Legal Rules as Exit Options
- Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
- Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Bargaining and Information
- Basic Models of the Litigation Process
- Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
- Information and Selection Bias
- Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
- Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law
- Notes
- References
- Glossary
- Index