Synopses & Reviews
A central question in European history is how did a great power pre-eminent in 1918 lie defeated by the same enemy less than 20 years later. Until recently the explanation has been sought in fundamental weaknesses that could only leave the French of 1940 hamstrung and demoralized. Recent studies have challenged that view and now, for the first time, the revisionist approach is displayed in a single volume, both summarizing the research of others and drawing on the author's own work in the archives.
The book is about as far from ‘dry as dust' diplomatic history as it's possible to get. Its very readable and the author manages to show with the telling anecdote that even a serious subject has its comic side: that, for instance, the French High Command kept forces stationed in the Alps for seven years because no one in the foreign service had thought to pass on news about a secret treaty between Italy and France in 1902; or that after a particularly stressful meeting Andrew Bonar Law, the British prime minister, mouth to Poincaré, the French president, through the closed carriage window of his train ‘and you go to hell', all the while smiling and exuding affability. Such episodes are not the substance of the book, but they oil its progress.
Review
"Adamthwaite skillfully mixes narrative with analysis, and integrates diplomatic history with political, economic, social, cultural and individual influences that ultimately shaped foreign relations. An excellent addition to undergraduate collections."--Choice
"Here is a responsible but absorbing account of a troubled moment in French history. This book richly deserves the broad readership which it seeks."--The Historian
"There are delightful pen portraits of politicians and diplomats such as Briand, Laval, Leger and Berthelot, and a gift for the witty phrase that makes the book a pleasure to read."--Military and Naval History Journal
Synopsis
This account of France's transition from victor in 1918 to vanquished in 1940 offers a long-overdue reassessment of all the central issues.
Synopsis
Recent studies have challenged the view of fundamental French weakness in 1940 and , for the first time, the revisionist approach is displayed in a
single volume, both summarizing the research of others and drawing on
the author's own work in the archives.
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. [254]-267) and index.
About the Author
Anthony Adamthwaite is Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley, USA.
Table of Contents
Illustrations, maps and tables
Preface
Acknowledgments
Chronology
Presidents and ministers of France (1914-1940)
1. France and the World
2. Armageddon
3. Peace-making, 1919
4. The Price of Victory
5. A flawed response
6. Predominance, 1919-1924
7. Locarno, 1925
8. Indian summer, 1926-1931
9. Economics, armaments, decision-making
10. Ideology, opinion and foreign policy
11. Challenges, 1932-1936
12. War again, 1936-1939
Epilogue
Notes
Guide to further reading
Index