Synopses & Reviews
In this detailed study, Christopher Norris defends the kinds of arguments advanced by the early realist, Hilary Putnam. Norris makes a point of placing Putnam's work in a wider philosophical context, and relating it to various current debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. Much like Putnam, Norris is willing to take full account of opposed viewpoints while maintaining a vigorously argued commitment to the values of debate and enquiry.
About the Author
Christopher Norris is Distinguished Research Professor in Philosophy at the University of Cardiff, Wales.
Table of Contents
Introduction * Realism, Scepticism, and Naturalism: Stages on the Putnam Road * Objectivity, Reference, and Truth: The Problem with Quantum Mechanics * Squaring with Wittgenstein: Versions of 'Realism' in Putnam's Later Philosophy * Can Realism be Naturalized?: Putnam on Sense, Commonsense, and the Senses * How Many Positrons Make Five?: Science, Scepticism, and the 'Ready-Made World' * The 'Many Faces' of Realism: Reference, Meaning, and Theory Change * Is Logic Revisable?: Putnam, Quine, and 'Contextual Apriority' * The Platonist Fix: Why 'Nothing Works' (According to Putnam) in Philosophy of Mathematics * Putnam, Peano, and the 'Malin Genie': Could We Possibly Be Wrong About Elementary Number Theory?
Introduction * Realism, Scepticism, and Naturalism: Stages on the Putnam Road * Objectivity, Reference, and Truth: The Problem with Quantum Mechanics * Squaring with Wittgenstein: Versions of 'Realism' in Putnam's Later Philosophy * Can Realism be Naturalized?: Putnam on Sense, Commonsense, and the Senses * How Many Positrons Make Five?: Science, Scepticism, and the 'Ready-Made World' * The 'Many Faces' of Realism: Reference, Meaning, and Theory Change * Is Logic Revisable?: Putnam, Quine, and 'Contextual Apriority' * The Platonist Fix: Why 'Nothing Works' (According to Putnam) in Philosophy of Mathematics * Putnam, Peano, and the 'Malin Genie': Could We Possibly Be Wrong About Elementary Number Theory?