Synopses & Reviews
This book seeks to explain why international donors may succeed in putting war-torn countries on the path of democratic transition and negative peace, but fail to consolidate the gains they make. Cambodia provides an excellent example for international peace builders: the donor community spent billions of dollars rebuilding the country between 1992 and 2006, but democracy remains unconsolidated and may even be receding towards "electoral dictatorship." Critical of neo-institutionalism, but sympathetic to historical and normative institutionalism, this book advances a theory called "complex realist institutionalism" to explain the limits of international democracy assistance to post-war societies.
Synopsis
This book explains why international donors may succeed in putting war-torn countries on the path of democratic transition and negative peace, but fail to consolidate the gains they make. Critical of neo-institutionalism, but sympathetic to historical and normative institutionalism, this book advances 'complex realist institutionalism' theory.
About the Author
SORPONG PEOU is Professor of International Security at Sophia University, Japan. He has written on Cambodian politics, international peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and regional security in Pacific Asia.
Table of Contents
Introduction * PART I: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK * Democratic Regime Consolidation & International Democracy Assistance * Institutional Structure & Structural Challenges * Research Methodology: Cambodia as Case Study * PART II: POWER VS. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION * Electoral Procedural Rules under Constraint * Liberal Norms under Stress * Liberty under Pressure * PART III: THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION * State Institutions' Underdevelopment * Political Society's Underdevelopment * Civil Society's Underdevelopment * PART IV: STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION * Non-Material Constraints * Economic Impediments * Political Impediments * PART V: THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE * Limits of Assistance for Institution Building * Limits of Economic Assistance * Limits of Political Assistance * Conclusion: Toward Complex Realist Institutionalism