Synopses & Reviews
In this book Russell Leng examines the behavior of nations in forty militarized crises occurring between 1816 and 1980. He employs a mass of empirical data to consider the conditions under which crises escalate to war or are resolved peacefully, and suggests that the most effective bargaining strategy is one that takes into account both the dictates of power politics, and other, less rational, political and psychological factors. The epilogue presents a provocative critical account of the bargaining strategies pursued by the United States and Iraq during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.
Review
"This is an excellent database which will benefit conflict analysts for many years to come, and the best application of events data to the study of international politics. It is also a superb example of theoretically driven, historically informed, and policy-relevant social science." The International History Review"...provides the studentof international relations with an excellent example of the traditionalis behaviourist debate that preoccupied the discipline in the sixties and seventies." J. Vanderkooy, Journal of European Integration"Leng's work is a very careful analysis of the intricate relations among crisis structure, crisis behavior, influence strategies, and crisis outcomes. As such, it provides valuable insights on crisis management at a level that is...dynamic and sensitive to the evolutionary nature of crises....[S]olid scholarship on international crisis....no serious student of international relations can afford to overlook...." Zeev Maoz, Mershon International Studies Review
Synopsis
An empirical study looking at the behavior of states during crises that could lead to war
Synopsis
This book is an empirical study of the behavior of states during crises that could lead to war, and the bargaining strategies most likely to lead to successful outcomes. The author concludes that both power politics and less rational political and psychological factors are important and applies his analysis to the Gulf War of 1990-1991.
Synopsis
The epilogue presents a provocative critique of the bargaining strategies pursued by the United States and Iraq during the Gulf Crisis of 1990 1991.
Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-252) and indexes.