Synopses & Reviews
Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth show how rational-choice theory can be applied to Japanese politics. Using the concept of principal and agent,Ramseyer/and Rosenbluth construct a persuasive account of political relationships in Japan. In doing so, they demonstrate that political considerations and institutional arrangements reign in what, to most of the world, looks like an independently powerful bureaucratic state.
Review
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth present a view of Japanese politics that coherently links voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and judges into patterns of interaction governed by the logic of the 'political marketplace.' They succeed in demonstrating that many of the analytical tools developed to study the politics of advanced Western democracies are not only applicable in the Japanese context, but also are capable of yielding novel interpretations of politics in Japan. Amy Searight
Review
[A] Well researched and carefully thought out study of Japanese politics. Pacific Affairs
Review
Fodder for scholarly research for years to come. Hugh Cortazzi - Asian Affairs
About the Author
J. Mark Ramseyer is Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard University Law School.Frances McCall Rosenbluth is Professor of Political Science at Yale University.
Harvard University Law School
Table of Contents
Introduction
Electoral Rules and Party Strategy
Demographics and Policy
Party Factions
Party Organization
Political Structure and Bureaucratic Incentives
Bureaucratic Manipulation
Political Structure and Judicial Incentives
Judicial Manipulation
Conclusion: Political Markets and Electoral Change
Notes
Reference
Index