Synopses & Reviews
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves--yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In his new book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point.
Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" only in the ordinary way, as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. In these terms, your personal identity is roughly a matter of those of your past actions that you are still responsible for because you are still "conscious" of them in Locke's special sense of that word.
Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
Review
"This book will appeal to Locke scholars and those interested in Locke's account of personal identity."--Choice
Review
"[E]legant and provocative. . . . There is no denying that the case he makes in this short but compelling book is a powerful one."--Barry Dainton, Times Literary Supplement
Review
[E]legant and provocative. . . . There is no denying that the case he makes in this short but compelling book is a powerful one. Barry Dainton
Review
This book will appeal to Locke scholars and those interested in Locke's account of personal identity. Times Literary Supplement
Synopsis
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves--yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In his new book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point.
Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" only in the ordinary way, as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. In these terms, your personal identity is roughly a matter of those of your past actions that you are still responsible for because you are still "conscious" of them in Locke's special sense of that word.
Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
Synopsis
"Galen Strawson proposes an original and provocative interpretation of Locke's treatment of personal identity. Strawson makes his case with characteristic depth, insight, ingenuity, and clarity. This engagingly written work should be of great interest to historians of modern philosophy and to all philosophers working on personal identity."
--Don Garrett, New York University"This is an important book and a very fine piece of work. It is bound to attract a great deal of attention."--Gideon Yaffe, University of Southern California
Synopsis
"Galen Strawson proposes an original and provocative interpretation of Locke's treatment of personal identity. Strawson makes his case with characteristic depth, insight, ingenuity, and clarity. This engagingly written work should be of great interest to historians of modern philosophy and to all philosophers working on personal identity."--Don Garrett, New York University
"This is an important book and a very fine piece of work. It is bound to attract a great deal of attention."--Gideon Yaffe, University of Southern California
Synopsis
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves--yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In his new book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point.
Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" only in the ordinary way, as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. In these terms, your personal identity is roughly a matter of those of your past actions that you are still responsible for because you are still "conscious" of them in Locke's special sense of that word.
Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
Synopsis
"Galen Strawson proposes an original and provocative interpretation of Locke's treatment of personal identity. Strawson makes his case with characteristic depth, insight, ingenuity, and clarity. This engagingly written work should be of great interest to historians of modern philosophy and to all philosophers working on personal identity."--Don Garrett, New York University
"This is an important book and a very fine piece of work. It is bound to attract a great deal of attention."--Gideon Yaffe, University of Southern California
About the Author
Galen Strawson taught philosophy at the University of Oxford for twenty years before moving to Reading University in 2001. His many books include "Freedom and Belief" and "Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics".
Table of Contents
Preface xi
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2 : "Person" 5
Chapter 3: "Person . . . is a forensic term" 17
Chapter 4: Concernment 22
Chapter 5: Consciousness 30
Chapter 6:"Consciousness . . . is inseparable from thinking" 42
Chapter 7 : "From the inside" 50
Chapter 8 : "Person" Locke's Definition 58
Chapter 9 : Consciousness Is Not Memory 72
Chapter 10 : Personal Identity 77
Chapter 11 : Psychological Connectedness 88
Chapter 12 : Transition (Butler Dismissed) 93
Chapter 13 : "But next . . . ": Personal Identity without Substantial Continuity 97
Chapter 14 : "And therefore . . . ": [I]-transfers, [Ag]-transfers, [P]-transfers 110
Chapter 15 : "A fatal error of theirs" 119
Chapter 16 : A Fatal Error of Locke's? 125
Chapter 17 : Circularity? 131
Chapter 18 : The Distinction between [P] and [S] 135
Chapter 19 : Concernment and Repentance 139
Chapter 20 : Conclusion 150
Postface 157
Appendix 1 : "Of Identity and Diversity" by John Locke 163
Appendix 2 : A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity by Edmund Law 233
References 253
Index 257