Synopses & Reviews
According to the prevailing view of counterinsurgency, the key to defeating insurgents is selecting methods that will win the peoples hearts and minds. The hearts-and-minds theory permeates not only most counterinsurgency books of the twenty-first century but the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the U.S. militarys foremost text on counterinsurgency. Mark Moyar assails this conventional wisdom, asserting that the key to counterinsurgency is selecting commanders who have superior leadership abilities. Whereas the hearts-and-minds school recommends allocating much labor and treasure to economic, social, and political reforms, Moyar advocates concentrating resources on security, civil administration, and leadership development.
Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency, from the Civil War and Reconstruction to Afghanistan and Iraq, that draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans, including top leaders in todays armed forces. Through a series of case studies, Moyar identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been much more prevalent in some organizations than others. He explains how the U.S. military and Americas allies in Afghanistan and Iraq should revamp their personnel systems in order to elevate more individuals with those attributes.
A Question of Command will reshape the study and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. With counterinsurgency now one of the most pressing issues facing the United States, this book is a must-read for policymakers, military officers, and citizens.
Review
“
Baghdad at Sunrise is a masterful account of command in counterinsurgency operations. Colonel Peter Mansoors superb description of his brigades experiences during our first year in Iraq is a must read for soldiers, scholars, and policymakers alikeand all would do well to examine the lessons he draws from his experiences.”David H. Petraeus, General, US Army
-- Hal Abelson - American Scientist
Review
“This book will be read by students at military academies and war colleges for years to come. It also speaks to general readers interested in Iraq, in the voices of our soldiers, and in understanding the problems we faced and those we created, without the hyperbole and politicization of most first-person accounts of the early years of this conflict.”Frederick W. Kagan, American Enterprise Institute -- David H. Petraeus
Review
"This is the best personal memoir of the Iraq War that I have seen."Conrad Crane, lead author of the
Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency -- Frederick W. Kagan
Review
“A moving, insightful, and unique account of a combat brigades experience in Iraq crafted by a gifted soldier-historiana must-read for anyone who wants to understand how the U.S. military is coping with counterinsurgency warfare in the 21st century.”H. R. McMaster, author of
Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam -- Conrad Crane
Review
"The Iraq war has produced many good books by sergeants and lieutenants, but few notable memoirs by senior officers. Finally, in
Baghdad at Sunrise, Colonel Mansoor gives us an account of a years combat in the Iraqi capital as seen by a brigade commander. Whats more, he brings the eye of a trained historian to the task. He is candid about both the successes and the failures of the U.S. military. Read it."Thomas E. Ricks, military correspondent, The Washington Post, and author of
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq -- H. R. McMaster
Review
“Colonel Mansoor has provided us with an exceptional memoir from mid-level of the tragic course of post-conflict operations in Iraq. It represents an account by a first-rate soldier and perceptive historian that is a must read for anyone interested in what really happened.”Williamson Murray, author of A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War -- Thomas E. Ricks
Review
"In reportage that crackles with the gunfire of street fighting, then segues into candid reflections on Americas military doctrines and policies, Mansoor draws readers directly into the tension of the Iraqi conflict. . . . A sober and balanced perspective."Booklist (starred review) -- Wiliamson Murray
Review
"Mansoor won a prestigious military-history award for his book The GI Offensive in Europe. Baghdad at Sunrise seems all but certain to net him another."Douglas Porch, Bookforum -- Booklist
Review
". . . good literature and good history. . . . [Mansoors] style is crisp, clear, and understated. . . . He tells his story from his viewpoint without judging others in the absence of unimpeachable evidence, and even then, lets the reader draw his own conclusions."COL Gregory Fontenot, Military Review -- Ralph Peters - New York Post
Review
"Peter Mansoors extraordinarily valuable Baghdad at Sunrise . . . . is a far better guide to counterinsurgency warfare than the official manual published by the Army and Marines. . . . This book has more intellectual integrity and utility."Ralph Peters, New York Post -- COL Gregory Fontenot - Military Review
Review
"The poetically titled
Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commanders War in Iraq takes discussion of foreign policy down to the nitty-gritty of operational reality."Benjamin Lytal,
New York Sun (Fall Books Preview)
-- Ralph Peters - New York Post
Review
"This is an exceptional memoir . . . .Simply stated, it is an impressive account that all prospective brigade, regimental and battalion commanders should read."Frank Hoffman, Small Wars Journal -- Benjamin Lytal - New York Sun
Review
"A valuable addition to the literature of the war. Mansoors great strength as an author is his insight into the nature of insurgent warfare in Iraq and the tactics required to defeat itsubjects on which he brings impressive credentials to bear."Jacob Laksin, City Journal -- Frank Hoffman - Small Wars Journal
Review
"Col. Mansoor displays the knowledge of a soldier alongside the narrative gifts of a true historian, weaving dramatic events together, capturing the thoughts and emotions of street-level fighters, and describing Iraqi society as it tries to emerge from the maelstrom of war."Mark Moyar, Wall Street Journal -- Jacob Laksin - City
Review
"Mansoors unflinching new account . . . is ne -- Mark Moyar - Wall Street Journal
Review
"This is a moving, clear, lucid, and extrememly valuable account of midlevel operations in Iraq in the early, crucial stages of the insurgency, with many valuable lessons. . . . As a memoir, Col. Mansoors book is honest, moving and exceptionally readable."Martin Sieff, Washington Times -- Bill Murphy - Washington Post
Review
"The last twelve pages alonereflectionsare worth the priceof the book. . . . Much rides on whether U.S. officials understand the lessons that Mansoor so eloquently lays bare."Michael Rubin, Middle East Quarterly -- Martin Sieff - Washington Times
Review
". . . extraordinarily valuable . . . destined to be studied in war colleges for generations. . . . a far better guide to counterinsurgency warfare than the official manual published by the Army and Marines. . . . This book has more intellectual integrity and utility."Ralph Peters, New York Post -- Michael Rubin - Middle East Quarterly
Review
"In the burgeoning literature on counterinsurgency prompted by American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, this volume stands out. Moyars argument, that the quality of leadership plays a far larger role in the outcome of such conflicts than is normally acknowledged, is surely correct; his graceful examination of conflicts spanning one hundred fifty years is convincing. A book that makes an important historical argument and, just as important, will be of use to leaders who will bear responsibility on the battlefields of the Long War."Eliot A. Cohen, author of Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime -- Reuel Marc Gerecht - The Weekly Standard
Review
"One of the great mistakes we made after the Vietnam War was forgetting what we learned there. Mark Moyar has ensured that we dont forget what we learned in Iraq over the last seven yearsand has also re-captured lessons from earlier conflicts."Thomas E. Ricks, author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq and The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 -- Eliot A. Cohen
Review
"Mark Moyar convincingly demonstrates that small unit leaders win counterinsurgencies. His chapter on Afghanistan is especially disturbing; I hope someone in authority is listening."Bing West, author of The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq -- Thomas E. Ricks
Review
“
A Question of Command stands out because it reaches back quite far, and to unexpected destinations.”
Wilson Quarterly -- Bing West
Review
“Moyars study of Vietnam--Triumph Forsaken--is becoming a classic in counterinsurgency circles. His new case studies--A Question of Command--are making it to the desks of top military decision makers.”--George Stephanopoulos, ABC News -- Wilson Quarterly
Review
“Moyar is a true pioneer in a field whose importance for national security has been accepted only reluctantly and belatedly by the American public. . . . Now we have a vastly improved roadmap for guidance.”-- John Tierney, Books and Culture -- George Stephanopoulos - ABC News
Review
“Terrorism, uniquely horrifying as it is, doesnt belong to an entirely separate and containable realm of human experience, like the one occupied by serial killers. Instead, its a tactic whose aims bleed into the larger, endless struggle of people to control land, set up governments, and exercise power. History is about managing that struggle.”--Nicholas Lemann,
The New Yorker
-- John Tierney - Books and Culture
Review
"Counterinsurgency warfare, as Mark Moyar demonstrates in his insightful historical study, is neither new nor unfathomable. Throughout the past, it fails when battlefield leaders do not understand the enemy and its methods, and succeeds only when officers can convince local populations why they are better off helping foreign troops than joining their own insurgents. Not high-tech weaponry, massive supply, or even training defeats insurgents. Only men smart, brave, sensitive, and inquisitive officers now and in the past, make the difference. Moyar offers a clear historical reminder of what defeats insurgencies at a time when most in the present age are sorely confused."Victor Davis Hanson, Stanford University -- Nicholas Lemann - New Yorker
Synopsis
This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after U.S. forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003. Army Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, the on-the-ground commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Divisionthe Ready First Combat Team”describes his brigades first year in Iraq, from the sweltering, chaotic summer after the Baathists defeat to the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government a year later. Uniquely positioned to observe, record, and assess the events of that fateful year, Mansoor now explains what went right and wrong as the U.S. military confronted an insurgency of unexpected strength and tenacity.
Drawing not only on his own daily combat journal but also on observations by embedded reporters, news reports, combat logs, archived e-mails, and many other sources, Mansoor offers a contemporary record of the valor, motivations, and resolve of the 1st Brigade and its attachments during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet this book has a deeper significance than a personal memoir or unit history. Baghdad at Sunrise provides a detailed, nuanced analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and along with it critically important lessons for Americas military and political leaders of the twenty-first century.
Synopsis
In October 2001, NATO forces invaded Afghanistan. Their initial aim, to topple the Taliban regime and replace it with a more democratic government aligned to Western interests, was swiftly achieved. However, stabilizing the country in the ensuing years has proven much more difficult. Despite billions of dollars in aid and military expenditure, Afghanistan remains a nation riddled with warlords, the world's major heroin producer, and the site of a seemingly endless conflict between Islamist militants and NATO forces.
In this timely and important book, Tim Bird and Alex Marshall offer a panoramic view of international involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011. Tackling the subject matter as a whole, Bird and Marshall weave together analysis of military strategy, regional context, aid policy, the Afghan government, and the many disagreements between and within the Western powers involved in the intervention. Given the complicating factors of the heroin trade, unwelcoming terrain, and precarious relations with Pakistan, the authors acknowledge the ways in which Afghanistan has presented unique challenges for its foreign invaders. Ultimately, however, they argue that the international community has failed in its self-imposed effort to solve Afghanistan's problems and that there are broader lessons to be learned from their struggle, particularly in terms of counterinsurgency and the ever-complicated work of "nation-building." The overarching feature of the intervention, they argue, has been an absence of strategic clarity and coherence.
Synopsis
Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as—at best—disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army.
In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs.
About the Author
Peter R. Mansoor is the General Raymond Mason Chair of Military History, Ohio State University. A recently retired U.S. Army colonel, he served as executive officer to Commanding General David H. Petraeus, Multi-National ForceIraq (20078); as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Group that proposed the surge strategy in Iraq (2006); as founding director of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (2006); and as Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Baghdad (20034). He lives in Columbus, OH.