Synopses & Reviews
andlt;bandgt;Why do competent armies fail?andlt;/bandgt;andlt;BRandgt;andlt;BRandgt;and#8226; Why did the American-led coalition in Iraq fail to wage a classic counter-insurgency campaign for so long after the fall of Baghdad? andlt;BRandgt;and#8226; Why was the sophisticated Israeli intelligence service so thoroughly surprised by the onslaught of combined Arab armies during the Yom Kippur War of 1973? andlt;BRandgt;and#8226; How did a dozen German U-boats manage to humiliate the U.S. Navy for nine months in 1942 -- sinking an average of 650,000 tons of shipping monthly? andlt;BRandgt;and#8226; What made the 1915 British-led invasion of Gallipoli one of the bloodiest catastrophes of the First World War? andlt;BRandgt;andnbsp;andnbsp;andnbsp;andnbsp; Since it was first published in 1990, andlt;iandgt;Military Misfortunesandlt;/iandgt; has become the classic analysis of the unexpected catastrophes that befall competent militaries. Now with a new Afterword discussing America's missteps in Iraq, Somalia, and the War on Terror, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's gripping battlefield narratives and groundbreaking explanations of the hidden factors that undermine armies are brought thoroughly up to date. As recent events prove, andlt;iandgt;Military Misfortunesandlt;/iandgt; will be required reading for as long as armies go to war.
Review
"The general reader will find this a fascinating and informative book; those responsible for their nations' security will find in it lessons they will ignore at their own peril." andlt;BRandgt; andlt;BRandgt; -- Major General (Res.) Aharon Yariv, former director, Israeli Military Intelligence
Review
"Cohen and Gooch have done their job well. They have mastered their sources, used considerable imagination...the book is well-written and sound in judgment." andlt;BRandgt; andlt;BRandgt; -- Caspar Weinberger, andlt;iandgt;The Wall Street Journalandlt;/iandgt;
Synopsis
Why do competent armies fail?
- Why did the American-led coalition in Iraq fail to wage a classic counter-insurgency campaign for so long after the fall of Baghdad?
- Why was the sophisticated Israeli intelligence service so thoroughly surprised by the onslaught of combined Arab armies during the Yom Kippur War of 1973?
- How did a dozen German U-boats manage to humiliate the U.S. Navy for nine months in 1942 -- sinking an average of 650,000 tons of shipping monthly?
- What made the 1915 British-led invasion of Gallipoli one of the bloodiest catastrophes of the First World War?
Since it was first published in 1990, Military Misfortunes has become the classic analysis of the unexpected catastrophes that befall competent militaries. Now with a new Afterword discussing America's missteps in Iraq, Somalia, and the War on Terror, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's gripping battlefield narratives and groundbreaking explanations of the hidden factors that undermine armies are brought thoroughly up to date. As recent events prove, Military Misfortunes will be required reading for as long as armies go to war.
Synopsis
Why do competent armies fail? Eliot Cohen and John Gooch explore answers to this question throughout this extensive analysis. Since it was first published in 1990, Military Misfortunes has become the classic analysis of the unexpected catastrophes that befall competent militaries. Now with a new Afterword discussing America's missteps in Iraq, Somalia, and the War on Terror, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's gripping battlefield narratives and groundbreaking explanations of the hidden factors that undermine armies are brought thoroughly up to date. As recent events prove, Military Misfortunes will be required reading for as long as armies go to war.
About the Author
Eliot A. Cohen is the Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University and founding director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies there. A graduate of Harvard College, he received his Ph.D. in political science at Harvard in 1982. After teaching at Harvard and at the Naval War College (Department of Strategy), he served on the policy planning staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, coming to SAIS in 1990. His most recent book is Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (Free Press, 2002): other books include (with John Gooch) Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. In 1991-93 he directed the U.S. Air Force’s official multi-volume study of the 1991 Gulf War, the Gulf War Air Power Survey. He has served as an officer in the United States Army Reserve, a member of the Defense Policy Advisory Board of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as other government advisory bodies.