Synopses & Reviews
This study links two fundamental political structures of the Cold War era, the transatlantic security system and the international monetary system. Central to this issue is a problem that soured relations among the Federal Republic and its major allies from the 1950s to the 1970s: Who was to bear the enormous cost of British and American troops in Germany? Both Washington and London identified this cost as a major reason for the decline of the pound and the dollar, whereas Germany reluctantly paid and traded "Money for Security", a fundamental pattern of its postwar foreign policy.
Review
"...Zimmermann has provided an excellent model for historians and policy analysts." Anni P. Baker, Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts, Canadian Journal of History"This book presents an entirely different perspective on familiar events and is well worth reading." Military Review"As Zimmermann successfully links the history of the cold war to that of the story of international monetary policy, and takes an admirable multinational approach, his work should interest anyone eager to understand how the West has tried to master the burdens of collective defence." The International History Review"Zimmermann's thorough research and cogent analysis of American, British, and German monetary issues... is a scholarly contribution to the historiography of the Cold War." The Journal of Military History
Synopsis
Links the transatlantic security system and the international monetary system during the Cold War era.
Table of Contents
Introduction; 1. On whose shoulders? German rearmament and the Cold War burden; 2. The British 'new look' and Anglo-German relations; 3. Adenauer and 'perfidious Albion': troop reductions, support costs, and the integration of Europe, 1957-1959; 4. The Radford plan: America and its troops in Germany, 1955-1958; 5. The political economy of US troop stationing in Europe; 6. Offset and monetary policy during the Kennedy administration, 1961-1962; 7. The bargain slowly unravels: offset, troop reductions, and the balance of payments, 1962-1965; 8. The culmination of the burden-sharing conflict: Chancellor Ehrard's visit to Washington in September 1966; 9. The trilateral negotiations of 1966-1967; Conclusion.