Synopses & Reviews
Is morality rational? In this book Gauthier argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice. He proposes a principle whereby choice is made on an agreed basis of cooperation, rather than according to what would give an individual the greatest expectation of value. He shows that such a principle not only ensures mutual benefit and fairness, thus satisfying the standards of morality, but also that each person may actually expect greater utility by adhering to morality, even though the choice did not have that end primarily in view. In resolving what may appear to be a paradox, the author establishes morals on the firm foundation of reason. Gauthier's argument includes an account of value, linking it to preference and utility; a discussion of the curcumstances in which morality is unnecessary; and an application of morals by agreement to relations between peoples at different levels of development and different generations. Finally, he reflects on the assumptions about individuality and community made by his account of rationality and morality.
Review
"One of the clearest, most rigorous, and most original attempts to provide a rational foundation for morality in the history of moral philosophy....Promises to become one of the seminal works of twentieth-century moral philosophy."--International Studies in Philosophy
"[A] seminal contribution...to the sub-genre of contractarian social philosophy....Represents the culmination and synthesis of over two decades of work scattered throughout many journals and anthologies....Gauthier's book is the most ambitious attempt to date to ground social morality in something more rigorous than a set of coherentists' equilibrating reflections. As such it should be studied, as should the surrounding literature it will no doubt generate. Gauthier wields game and decision theory with aplomb, and provides excellent expositions of more technical points....It is, without doubt, one of the most important contributions to contractarian theory since Rawls' Theory of Justice."--Reason Papers
"Through a series of subtle yet entirely tough-minded arguments, Gauthier attempts to show that rational individuals will dispose themselves to be more, and they will do so not in contravention of their rationality but in its service....The philosophical skill with which he directs his argument is formidable....A signal contribution to moral philosophy....Rarely is the philosophical world graced with so sustained and strong an examination of foundational questions."--Critical Review
"This book presents a sophisticated contractarian moral theory, the most sophisticated yet developed in the tradition of Hobbes....There is a rapidly growing literature on Gauthier's theory, and the attention is well merited."--The Philosophical Review
"Possibly the most important book on the fundamental theory of justice in the last couple of centuries: the state-of-the-art presentation of the basic ideas of liberalism....Demands the careful attention of every serious student of these matters. It sets, indeed, a new standard of rigor and precision in moral philosophy."--International Philosophical Quarterly
Synopsis
Are moral principles actually principles of rational choice? Starting from the view that it is rational always to choose what will give one the greatest expectation of value or utility--and the common counter-claim that this procedure, applied in many situations, will actually leave people worse off than need be--Gauthier instead proposes a principle of cooperation whereby each must choose in accordance with a principle to which all can agree. He shows that not only does such a principle ensure mutual benefit and fairness, but also that each person may expect greater utility from actually adhering to a morality based on it, even though his other choice did not have that specific end primarily in view. In resolving what may appear to be a paradox, he establishes morals on the foundation of reason.
Synopsis
In this book the author argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice. According to the usual view of choice, a rational person selects what is likely to give the greatest expectation of value or utility.