Synopses & Reviews
One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. In this new book, Daniel Russell explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. Russell argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. Likewise, Russell argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or "phronesis"--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which Russell argues is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues--a trend Russell argues is ultimately perilous for virtue theory. This book also takes a penetrating look at issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and that elusive figure, 'the virtuous person'. Written in a clear and careful manner, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues will appeal to philosophers and students alike in moral philosophy and moral psychology.
About the Author
Daniel Russell (Ph.D., University of Arizona, 2000) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wichita State University, Kansas. His main research and teaching interests lie in ancient philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy. He is the author of
Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford, 2005), and is currently completing a book on the relation of virtue to happiness, bridging ancient and modern perspectives.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach
Part 1. Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action
Chapter 2 Right Action for Virtue Ethics
Chapter 3 Right Action and Virtuous Motives
Chapter 4 Right Action and 'the Virtuous Person'
Part 2. The Enumeration Problem
Chapter 5 The Enumeration Problem
Chapter 6 Individuating the Virtues
Chapter 7 Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination
Part 3. Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues
Chapter 8 Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions
Chapter 9 Situations and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence
Chapter 10 From Situationism to Virtue Theory
Part 4. Defending Hard Virtue Theory
Chapter 11 Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues
Chapter 12 Responsibility for Character
Works Cited
Index Locorum
General Index
1. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach
Part 1. Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action
2. Right Action for Virtue Ethics
3. Right Action and Virtuous Motives
4. Right Action and 'the Virtuous Person'
Part 2. The Enumeration Problem
5. The Enumeration Problem
6. Individuating the Virtues
7. Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination
Part 3. Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues
8. Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions
9. Situations and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence
10. From Situationism to Virtue Theory
Part 4. Defending Hard Virtue Theory
11. Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues
12. Responsibility for Character
Works Cited
Index Locorum
General Index