Synopses & Reviews
Over the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil trials. Probably the most extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in the Florida class action lawsuit brought against cigarette manufacturers. Or consider two recent verdicts against the auto manufacturer BMW in Alabama. In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. In cases involving accidents, civil rights, and the environment, multimillion-dollar punitive awards have been a subject of intense controversy.
But how do juries actually make decisions about punitive damages? To find out, the authors-experts in psychology, economics, and the law-present the results of controlled experiments with more than 600 mock juries involving the responses of more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens. Although juries tended to agree in their moral judgments about the defendant's conduct, they rendered erratic and unpredictable dollar awards. The experiments also showed that instead of moderating juror verdicts, the process of jury deliberation produced a striking "severity shift" toward ever-higher awards. Jurors also tended to ignore instructions from the judges; were influenced by whatever amount the plaintiff happened to request; showed "hindsight bias," believing that what happened should have been foreseen; and penalized corporations that had based their decisions on careful cost-benefit analyses. While judges made many of the same errors, they performed better in some areas, suggesting that judges (or other specialists) may be better equipped than juries to decide punitive damages.
Using a wealth of new experimental data, and offering a host of provocative findings, this book documents a wide range of systematic biases in jury behavior. It will be indispensable for anyone interested not only in punitive damages, but also jury behavior, psychology, and how people think about punishment.
Synopsis
Over the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil trials. But how do juries actually make decisions about punitive damages? To find out, the authors--specialists in psychology, economics, and the law--present the results of controlled experiments with over 600 mock juries."Just in case any risk manager or adjuster has forgotten just how capricious juries can be, this book is a wake-up call. To defendants, it will be scarier than the latest Hollywood special effect fright-fest. Findings: jurors tend to ignore judge's instructions, show hindsight bias in believing that all bad things should have been foreseen, and penalize companies that make cost/benefit decisions."--Investment Week, Top 10 Risk Management Books of the Year"Now it can be said with supreme confidence that the prevailing system of punitive damages regularly deviates from express legal standards."--Bruce Fein, Washington Times"The complexity and breadth of each of the editor's various studies is astounding. . . . An impressive collection of research that helps the reader better understand the inherent flaws of the punitive-damages decision-making process."--Patrick K. Fitzgerald, New York Law Journal"The complexity and breadth of each of the editors' various studies is astounding. . . . An impressive collection of research that helps the reader better understand the inherent flaws of the punitive-damages decision-making process."--Patrick K. Fitzgerald, New York Law Journal"A ground-breaking book that will rank with The American Jury in its influence on American law."--James Dabney Miller, Legal Times
Synopsis
Over the past two decades, the United States has seen a dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil trials. Probably the most extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in the Florida class action lawsuit brought against cigarette manufacturers. Or consider two recent verdicts against the auto manufacturer BMW in Alabama. In identical cases, argued in the same court before the same judge, one jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages, while the other awarded no punitive damages at all. In cases involving accidents, civil rights, and the environment, multimillion-dollar punitive awards have been a subject of intense controversy.
But how do juries actually make decisions about punitive damages? To find out, the authors-experts in psychology, economics, and the law-present the results of controlled experiments with more than 600 mock juries involving the responses of more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens. Although juries tended to agree in their moral judgments about the defendant's conduct, they rendered erratic and unpredictable dollar awards. The experiments also showed that instead of moderating juror verdicts, the process of jury deliberation produced a striking "severity shift" toward ever-higher awards. Jurors also tended to ignore instructions from the judges; were influenced by whatever amount the plaintiff happened to request; showed "hindsight bias," believing that what happened should have been foreseen; and penalized corporations that had based their decisions on careful cost-benefit analyses. While judges made many of the same errors, they performed better in some areas, suggesting that judges (or other specialists) may be better equipped than juries to decide punitive damages.
Using a wealth of new experimental data, and offering a host of provocative findings, this book documents a wide range of systematic biases in jury behavior. It will be indispensable for anyone interested not only in punitive damages, but also jury behavior, psychology, and how people think about punishment.
About the Author
Cass R. Sunstein is the Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence in the Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago.
Reid Hastie is a professor of behavioral science in the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago.
John W. Payne is the Joseph J. Ruvane Jr. Professor of Management, professor of psychology, and research professor of statistics and decision sciences at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University.
David A. Schkade is the Herbert D. Kelleher Regents Professor of Business at the University of Texas at Austin.
W. Kip Viscusi is the John F. Cogan Jr. Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard Law School.
Table of Contents
Preface and Acknoweldgments
Introduction
The Problem and Efforts to Understand It
1 Overview: What We Did and What We Found
Part I: How Juries Think
A From Outrage to Dollars
Introduction
2 Shared Outrage, Erractic Awards
3 Deliberating about Dollars: The Severity Shift
4 Do Plaintiffs' Request and Plaintiffs' Identities Matter?
B To Punish or Not?
Introduction
5 Judging Corporate Recklessness
6 Looking Backward in Punitive Judgments: 20-20 Vision?
C Jurors and Judges as Risk Managers
Introduction
7 Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?
8 Do People Want Optimal Detterence?
9 Detterence Instructions: What Jurors Won't Do
10 Judging Risk and Reckelssness
11 Do Judges Do Better?
Part II: Conclusions
12 Putting It All Together
13 What Should Be Done?
Appendix: Judge's Instructions
Glossary
Bibliography
List of Contributors
Index