Synopses & Reviews
Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge.
Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge." Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. For instance, people watching the Super Bowl know that many others are seeing precisely what they see and that those people know in turn that many others are also watching. This creates common knowledge, and advertisers selling products that depend on consensus are willing to pay large sums to gain access to it. Remarkably, a great variety of rituals and ceremonies, such as formal inaugurations, work in much the same way.
By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems, while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it.
Review
"Communal activities, with lots of emotional and symbolic content . . . serve a rational purpose, argues Michael Suk-Young Chwe. . . . [His] work, like his own academic career, bridges several social sciences."
--Virginia Postrel, New York Times
Review
This is a very compelling and original work. It is the best conceptual book I have read in economics in several years. It will have an immediate and enthusiastic readership in the social sciences and will make Chwe's name as an important thinker.
Review
"A welcome addition. . . .
Rational Ritual . . . can be understood and enjoyed by almost anyone interested in human interaction."
--Vincent P. Crawford, Journal of Economic Literature
Synopsis
Why do internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? This book answers these questions using a single concept common knowledge. Game theory shows that to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge." Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures."
Synopsis
"This is a very compelling and original work. It is the best conceptual book I have read in economics in several years. It will have an immediate and enthusiastic readership in the social sciences and will make Chwe's name as an important thinker."--Tyler Cowen, George Mason University
"Rational Ritual is engaging, well organized, and well written. It brings together the tools of game theory and the issues posed within a wide variety of areas of contemporary social theory to address an important problem. Students and scholars in diverse academic disciplines--including political science, sociology, anthropology, and some areas of cultural studies--will find the book both relevant and accessible."--David Ruccio, University of Notre Dame
About the Author
Michael Suk-Young Chwe is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has published widely on game theory and its applications to social networks, monetary theory, collective action, minority voting rights, and physical violence.
Table of Contents
List of Figures and Tables ix
Preface xiii
1. Introduction
What This Book Is Good For 3
The Argument 8
Coordination Problems 11
Common Knowledge 13
Where the Argument Comes From 16
2. Applications 19
Ceremonies and Authority 19
How Do Rituals Work? 25
Imward-Facing Circles 30
On the Waterfront 33
Believe the Hype 37
The Price of Publicity 49
Strong Links and Weak Links 61
The Chapel in the Panopticon 66
3. Elaborations 74
Competing Explanations 74
Is Common Knowledge an Impossible Ideal? 76
Meaning and Common Knowledge 79
Contesting Common Knowledge 83
Common Knowledge and Group Identity 91
4. Conclusion 94
Appendix: The Argument Expressed Diagrammatically 101
References 113
Index 127