Synopses & Reviews
The essays in this volume investigate the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the natural world, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and language, to metaethics and the theory of practical reasoning; this range is well represented here.
Table of Contents
Introduction,
Alan Millar and José Luis BermúdezPart I: Objectivity and Normativity
1. How are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?, Paul Boghossian
2. On Basic Logical Knowledge: Reflections on Paul Boghossian's 'How are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?', Crispin Wright
3. Practical Reasoning, John Broome
4. Reasons for Action and Instrumental Rationality, Alan Millar
Part II: Psychological Reality and Psychological Explanation
5. The Rational Analysis of Human Cognition, Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford
6. The Rational and the Real: Some Doubts About the Programme of Rational Analysis, E. J. Lowe
7. The Rationality of Evolutionary Psychology, David Over
8. Commitment and Change of View, Isaac Levi
9. Rationality and Psychological Explanation Without Language, José Luis Bermúdez
10. Normative Explanations: Invoking Rationality to Explain Happenings, Allan Gibbard