Synopses & Reviews
This book examines the interaction between state security and regime security in South Korea under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee in the period 1953-60. In examining the reasons which led Rhee to repeatedly call to "march North," such as to remove the Communists and to empower Korea in the aftermath of the Korean War, the author shows that the "march North" was a manifestation of Rhee's concern for both state and regime security. Rhee's aggressive anti-Communist policy contributed to the promotion of security in South Korea. As he declined in popularity, Rhee's concern for the survival of the regime increased and he used the prevailing anti-Communist feeling to enhance his legitimacy. However, such tactics could ensure neither regime security nor the security of South Korea.
Synopsis
This fascinating book examines the interaction between state security and regime security in South Korea from 1953 to 1960, under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee.
Synopsis
This book examines the interaction between state security and regime security in South Korea under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee in the period 1953-60.
About the Author
Yong-Pyo Hong is Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, Seoul.
Table of Contents
Preface * Introduction * Historical Setting: The Division of Korea, Korean War, and the Evolution of Syngman Rhee's Anti-Communist Policy * The Ending of the Korean War and Syngman Rhee's Search for a US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, April-August 1953 * The Post-Armistice Security Policy of Syngman: The Strengthening of ROK Forces, September 1953-November 1954 * Internal and External Challenges to the Rhee Regime Security, November 1954-May 1956 * The Primacy of Regime Security and the Vulnerability of State Security, May 1956-November 1958 * The Domestic Use of State Security and the Collapse of the Rhee Regime, December 1958-April 1960 * Conclusion: the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea * Bibliography * Index